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TRANSNATIONAL

CLASS ACTIONS AND

INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION
Rhonda Wasserman*
INTRODUCTION

As global markets have expanded and transborder disputes have
multiplied, American courts have been pressed to certify transnational
class actions-i.e., class actions brought on behalf of large numbers of
foreign citizens or against foreign defendants.' The Supreme Court's
© 2011 The University of Notre Dame. Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation
to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B., Cornell
University; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank Ron Brand, Vivian Curran,
Sam Issacharoff, Justine Stefanelli, and Patrick Woolley for their helpful suggestions
and comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am grateful to Emma Finney, Nate
Gruz, Tim Stienstraw, and Lauren Williams for their diligent research assistance and
to Linda Tashbook for her invaluable help. I served on the Advisory Board for the
Judgments Project undertaken by the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law described in Part II.A of this Article. In addition, I provided
assistance to Justine Stefanelli, the Project Research Fellow and the National
Rapporteur for the United States, in preparing the Report of the United States
submitted in connection with the Judgments Project.
1 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (rejecting
the application of U.S. securities law in a putative class action filed by Australian
shareholders against an Australian bank); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig.,
522 F. Supp. 2d 712, 721-24 (D.N.J. 2007) (holding that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the securities claim because the oil company did not engage
in sufficient conduct within the United States); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: ManagingJurisdictional Conflict, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 38-41 (2007) (noting the increasing rate at which transnational cases are being filed); Steven S. Kaufhold, InternationalSecurities Class Actions:
The World's Investors Come to U.S. Courts, CADS REP. (ABA Section of Litig., Class Action
& Derivative Suit Comm., Chicago, Ill.), Winter 2009, at 1, 12 (same). According to
one recent account, the number of securities class actions filed in American courts
against private foreign issuers nearly doubled between 2006 and 2007 and "two of the
ten largest securities class action settlements in history have been paid by foreign
issuers to settle claims in U.S. courts." Id.
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recent decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.2 is likely to
reduce the number of "foreign-cubed" or "f-cubed" securities fraud
class actions filed in the United States, at least in the short term. 3 But
Morrison is unlikely to inhibit the filing of transnational class actions
involving securities listed on domestic stock exchanges, transnational
class actions raising claims that arise under federal laws that apply
extraterritorially, or transnational class actions against defendants
whose conduct within the United States is the "focus" of Congressional concern. In short, even after Morrison, class counsel are likely
to keep filing transnational class actions and defense counsel are likely
to keep opposing them.
Defendants in transnational class actions often oppose certification by arguing that the superiority prong of Rule 23(b) (3) is not satisfied. 4 In particular, defendants argue that a class action is not
2 130 S. Ct. 2869.
3 "Foreign-cubed" or "f-cubed" class actions are class actions against a foreign
issuer of securities by a plaintiff class including foreign investors who purchased securities on a foreign exchange. See Buxbaum, supranote 1, at 17; Stephen J. Choi & LindaJ.
Silberman, TransnationalLitigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis.
L. REv. 465, 472-75; Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate LitigationAcross the Atlantic and the
Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1, 33 n.147 (2009). Morrison held
that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act applies only to "transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities." Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2874. Morrison is expected to dramatically reduce the
number of f-cubed class actions filed in federal courts in the United States. See Luke
Green, Morrison v. National Australia Bank-The Dawn of a New Age, RiSKMETR1CS
GROUP INSIGHT (June 25, 2010, 5:54 PM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/slw/2010/06/
morrison-v -national-australia -bank-the-dawn -of-a -new-age.html (viewing Morrison
as "a clear precedent that drastically reins in the extraterritorial reach of US securities
fraud laws"). Section 929Y of the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act directs the Securities and Exchange Commission to
study whether private rights of action under section 10(b) should be extended to
cover "(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United
States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the
United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States."
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929Y, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). Depending
upon the results of the study, Congress may legislatively overrule Morrison, which
"could mean ... a reversion back to the pre -Morrisonera of large multi -national class
action litigation." Luke Green, Post-Morrison Legislative Developments, RiSKMETRICS
GROUP INSIGHT (July 12, 2010, 2:12 PM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/slw/2010/07/
as -discussed 4n -our-previous.html.
4 The superiority prong of Rule 23(b) (3) permits maintenance of a class action
only if "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3). For the argument that "the
binding effect ofjudgments should not be addressed as part of the superiority inquiry

2011]

INTERJURISDICTIONAL

PRECLUSION

superior to alternative means of dispute resolution because European

courts will not recognize or accord preclusive effect to an American
class action judgment in the defendant's favor. Thus, defendants fear
repetitive litigation on the same claim in foreign courts even if they
5
were to prevail in an American court.
In considering this argument against certification, American
courts often use judgment recognition and preclusion terminology
interchangeably. They discuss the "'possibility' that a foreign court
may not recognize a judgment" 6 and the fear that an American class
action judgment "might not be given preclusive effect in foreign
'7
courts" as though recognition and preclusion analyses are identical.
But they are not.
of Rule 23(b)," see Matthew H. Jasilli, Note, A Rat Res? Questioning the Value of Res
Judicatain Rule 23(b)(3) SuperiorityInquiriesfor Foreign Cubed Class Action SecuritiesLitigations, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 114, 118-19 (2009).
5 See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76, 92 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (discussing the litigant's fear of relitigating the same claim in foreign courts
even if it prevailed in the American courts), reconsideration denied, No. 02 Civ.
5571(RJH) (HBP), 2009 WL 855799, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) ("The Court
acknowledges the possibility that some French class members-those who do not
receive actual notice of this action-may not be absolutely precluded from relitigating
their claims. Yet this possibility is just that."); Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG
(In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig.), 216 F.R.D. 291, 301 (D. Del. 2003) (discussing
the litigant's fear of relitigating the same claim in foreign courts even if it prevailed in
the American courts); Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113, 134-36 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (same); Ansari v. N.Y. Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 116-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same);
CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (same); see also Rachael Mulheron, The Casefor an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 445-46
(2009) (same). In grappling with these transnational class actions, American courts
have had to address a host of other interesting and difficult issues, including the availability of federal subject matter jurisdiction, see In re Royal Dutch/Shell, 522 F. Supp. 2d
at 717-24; In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 366-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
But see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (holding that the extraterritorial reach of a federal
statute is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one); the amenability of foreign
defendants to personal jurisdiction in the United States, see In re Alstom, 406 F. Supp.
2d at 397-401; Cromer Fin. Ltd., 205 F.R.D. at 126; Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 452, 489-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); the management quandaries that may arise in
transnational litigation involving large numbers of non-English speaking class members, see In re DaimlerChiysler,216 F.R.D. at 301; and the appropriateness of naming a
foreign investor as the lead plaintiff under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, see In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 493-503 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re
Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 219 F.R.D. 343, 352-53 (D. Md. 2003); In re
Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 217 F.R.D. 372, 376-77 (E.D. Va. 2003).
6 Cromer Fin. Ltd., 205 F.R.D. at 135 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975)).
7 Id. at 134.
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American courts are conflating what should be a two-step analysis
into one. They should be asking, first, would the foreign court recognize the American class action judgment? And second, if it would,
what preclusive effect, if any, would the American class action judgment
have in the foreign court? Instead, while employing both recognition
and preclusion terminology, the American courts typically focus only
on the former question, examining only whether the foreign court
would decline to recognize the American class action judgment
because it violates "international public policy."8 The American
courts rarely, if ever, consider the second step: the preclusive effect, if
any, that an American class action judgment would receive if it were
recognized abroad. The failure to address this second step is problematic because even if a foreign court were to recognize an American
class action judgment, the defendant could face a risk of relitigation if
the judgment were not accorded robust preclusive effect.
This Article seeks to analyze the missing second step-the preclusive effect of an American class action judgment-drawing heavily on
a project by the British Institute of International and Comparative
Law (BIICL) undertaken to assess the preclusive effects of judgments
under the national laws of a select group of European countries. 9
Even in Europe, where the Brussels/Lugano Regime governs the recognition and enforcement of Member State judgments in civil and
commercial matters, 10 little attention has been paid to the question of
the preclusive effects to be afforded to such judgments. 1
8 See In re Vivendi Universal, 2009 WL 855799, at *3; see also In re Vivendi Universal,
242 F.R.D. at 96, 100 (asking whether the American judgment would "contravene
French concepts of international public policy" and "'infringe principles of universal
justice'" (quoting Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] le
civ., May 25, 1948, Bull. civ. 1, No. 19 (Fr.))); In reDaimlerChrysler,216 F.R.D. at 301
(addressing the defendants' contention "that there is a significant likelihood that foreign courts will not recognize and enforce a United States judgment"); Cromer Fin.
Ltd., 205 F.R.D. at 135 (focusing on expert opinions that debated whether American
class actions would be recognized in England and Switzerland or whether a public
policy or ordre public exception would apply); CL-Alexanders Laing, 127 F.R.D. at
459-60 (considering an affidavit submitted by a British barrister, which addressed
whether a British court will recognize a judgment rendered in a U.S. "opt-out" class
action); Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in

European Legal Systems, 1 ERAsMus L. REv. 31, 34-39 (2008) (Neth.) (purporting to
address whether European courts "could refuse ResJudicata effect to [an American]
class action judgment," but actually analyzing the reasons why European courts
decline to recognize American class action judgments).

9
10

See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
See infra note 69.

11

See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
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The Article is divided into three Parts. Part I examines the
preclusive effects of class action judgments in U.S. courts. A defendant who raises the risk of repetitive litigation abroad to oppose certification of a transnational class action at home assumes that, in a
purely domestic case, a class action judgment in its favor would shield
it from duplicative individual suits by absent class members in American courts. Accordingly, the defendant argues that the American
court should not certify a transnational class unless its judgment
would be accorded the same preclusive effects abroad. 12 Part I
assesses the accuracy of the defendant's assumption regarding the
nature and scope of the protection that American preclusion law
affords successful class action defendants. As we will see, while American preclusion doctrine provides defendants with meaningful protection against repetitive individual suits following a class action victory, it
does not guarantee defendants protection from allfollow-up litigation
that individual class members may bring.
With the American preclusion landscape as background, Part II
of the Article assesses the magnitude of the risk that an American class
action judgment will not be accorded preclusive effect in Europe. As
noted above, this inquiry is distinct from, and logically follows resolution of, the recognition issue. Subpart A of Part II introduces BIICL
and its Judgments Project, upon which the Article draws. Subpart B
analyzes important basic differences between American preclusion
doctrine, on the one hand, and the preclusion doctrines of the participating European countries, on the other. Subpart C then considers
the extent to which the participating European countries permit class
actions or other forms of group litigation in their own courts and the
extent to which their domestic class action or group litigation judgments are accorded preclusive effect in the courts of the rendering
country. Subpart D of Part II considers the extent to which these
European countries accord preclusive effect to the class action or
group litigation judgments of other countries.
Finally, drawing upon the data gathered in Part II, Part III of the
Article seeks to draw tentative conclusions regarding the risk that
American class action judgments will not be accorded the same
preclusive effects in European courts that they would receive in American courts. Part III also makes recommendations for further study.

12 See Pinna, supra note 8, at 38 (expressing concern that foreign class members
might bring new claims in a foreign court against a defendant that prevailed against
the class in the United States).
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THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECTs OF CLASS ACTION JUDGMENTS IN
U.S. COURTS

A.

Claim PreclusiveEffects of Class Action Judgments

Defendants in transnational class actions pending in American
courts often oppose class certification by arguing that class action
judgments will not be given preclusive effect abroad.' 3 The unspoken
assumption is that the preclusive effects of class action judgments provide defendants in American courts with robust protection against
repetitive individual lawsuits by absent class members seeking to relitigate the claim adjudicated or settled in the class action. The first
order of business, then, is to assess the accuracy of this assumption
and to gauge the extent to which ajudgment rendered against a plaintiff class precludes absent class members from pursuing the same
14
claim against the same defendant.
Outside the class action context, a valid and final judgment in the
defendant's favor extinguishes the plaintiff's entire claim and bars a
subsequent action by the same plaintiff against the same defendant on
the same claim. 15 According to the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments.
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar
....
,the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the
action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", and what
groupings constitute a "series", are to be determined pragmatically,
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related
in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a conve13 See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal,2009 WL 855799, at *3; In re Vivendi Universal,
242 F.R.D. at 92; CL-Alexanders Laing, 127 F.R.D. at 459-60.

14 A comprehensive treatment of this complicated and fascinating issue is beyond
the scope of this Article. For an excellent theoretical analysis of preclusion and
intraclass conflicts of interest, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action
Litigation, 105 CoLum. L. REv. 717 (2005). For an excellent, more practically oriented
discussion with helpful illustrations, see 7AA CARL Es ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789 (3d ed. 2005); 18A
R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 4455 (2d ed. 2002). For a discussion of the unique preclusion
issues that arise when successive class actions are brought, see Rhonda Wasserman,
Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 484-97 (2000).
CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR

AND PROCEDURE

15

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§§ 17(2), 19 (1982).
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to
nient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms
16
the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.

Under this transactional test, ajudgment's claim preclusive effect
will bar a second action by the same plaintiff as long as the facts
underlying the claims are the same, even if the legal theory relied
upon, the evidence offered, or the relief sought is different. 17 This
ban on claim splitting would, for example, preclude an individual who
lost an employment discrimination action in which she sought injunctive relief from suing her employer a second time for the same discriminatory conduct even if the second suit sought money damages or
pursued a different legal theory. 18
Claim preclusion affords a prevailing class action defendant
meaningful protection from follow-up suits by absent class members.
As the Supreme Court stated in the leading case of Cooper v. Federal

Reserve Bank, 19 "a judgment in a properly entertained class action is
binding on class members in any subsequent litigation .... A judgment in favor of the defendant extinguishes the claim, barring a subsequent action on that claim." 20 In Cooper, the class representatives
16 Id. § 24.
17 See id. § 24 cmt. a; see also, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 398 (1981) ("A final judgment on the merits ...precludes the parties... from
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." (citing Comm'r
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948))); Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F.3d
1142, 1146, 1148-53 (10th Cir. 2006) (clarifying and applying the Restatement's transactional test); Havercombe v. Dep't of Educ., 250 F.3d 1, 3-9 (1st Cir. 2001) (same);
Maharaj v. BankAmerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the Restatement's transactional test and adding that "when the second action concerns a transaction occurring after the commencement of the prior litigation, claim preclusion
generally does not come into play" (citing SEC v. FirstJersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450,
1464 (2d Cir. 1996))).
Manego v. Orleans Bd. of Trade, 773 F.2d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir. 1985) (hold18 See, e.g.,
ing that the judgment in an action alleging race discrimination in the denial of business licenses precluded a second suit alleging an antitrust conspiracy to deny the
same licenses); Kabes v. Sch. Dist., 387 F. Supp. 2d 955, 966-67 (W.D. Wis. 2005)
(holding that the judgment in a suit seeking reinstatement precluded a second suit
seeking money damages for the same transfer); Metzenbaum v. John Carroll Univ.,
987 F. Supp. 610, 614-15 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that the dismissal with prejudice
of a claim for employment discrimination seeking only injunctive relief precluded a
second claim alleging discrimination seeking different relief).
19 467 U.S. 867 (1984); see also Wasserman, supra note 14, at 489-90 (outlining
the Cooper Court's discussion of the preclusive effects of a class action judgment);
Wolff, supra note 14, at 724-31 (analyzing Cooper and concluding that it "is a Title VII
opinion, not an opinion about the preclusive effects of class action judgments").
20 Cooper, 467 U.S. at 874 (citing, inter alia, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3); Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 41(1)(e)).
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alleged that the defendant bank had engaged in a pattern of racial
discrimination.2 1 The district court found that the bank had discriminated against employees in pay grades four and five, but otherwise
found insufficient evidence of a pattern of discrimination to justify
relief. 22 Individual employees in pay grades above five, who had been

absent class members, then filed individual suits against the bank,
alleging racial discrimination. 23 The defendant argued that the plaintiffs were bound by the determination that there was no discrimina24
tion in their pay grades.
In explaining the preclusive effects of the class action judgment,
the Court explained that the judgment in Cooper
(1) bar[red] the class members from bringing another class action
against the Bank alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination for
the relevant time period and (2) preclude[d] the class members in
any other litigation with the Bank from relitigating the question
whether the Bank engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimina25
tion against black employees during the relevant time period.
Thus, the judgment precluded the absent class members from relitigating the same claim, narrowly defined, and the same issues that had
been presented in the class action.
But while ajudgment in an individualaction will preclude a plaintiff from suing the same defendant a second time for the same conduct, even if the follow-up suit seeks a different remedy or presents a
different theory, the Supreme Court in Cooper and many American
courts have tempered the claim preclusive effects of class action judgments to facilitate the prosecution of class actions on behalf of narrowly defined classes, pursuing only those portions of potential claims
26
that are shared by the group.
21 Id. at 869-70.
22 Id. at 871-72.
23 Id. at 869-70.
24 Id. at 872-73.
25 Id. at 880.
26 See id. at 874-81; 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4455, at 459,
461; see also Wolff, supra note 14, at 722 ("[I]f the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion that are associated with individual litigation were to apply unaltered to class proceedings, the preclusion inquiry would sometimes reveal significant obstacles to class
certification ...

.").

Some American courts have concluded that certain class actions

should not be, or should not have been, certified given the perceived risk that a later
court might accord preclusive effect to the class action judgment and thereby preclude follow-up claims by absent class members. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declining to

certify a products liability class action seeking only injunctive relief because of the
"risk that subsequent courts would preclude absent class members from bringing per-
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To understand how and why the Cooper Court adapted claim preclusion doctrine for class actions, it is helpful first to examine the
Court's treatment of issue preclusion. The Cooper Court distinguished
between a class-wide practice, on the one hand, and the distinct issue
of individual discrimination raised in the subsequent actions, on the
other. 27 It emphasized "that the rejection of a claim of classwide discrimination does not warrant the conclusion that no member of the
class could have a valid individual claim." 28 Because the issues underlying the class's pattern claim and the individual plaintiffs' discrimination claims were different, issue preclusion did not bar litigation of
29
the distinct issues.
Without explicitly addressing the general ban on claim splitting,
the Cooper Court permitted the absent class members to pursue individual claims of discrimination even though those claims were transac30
tionally related to the pattern claims adjudicated in the class action.
sonal injury claims"); Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 550-51 (D.
Minn. 1999) (questioning the adequacy of representation afforded by a representative who brought only fraud claims against the cigarette manufacturers and sought to
reserve personal injury claims for individual litigation and noting that "[a] subsequent court may very well find that individual injury and damage claims should have
been litigated in this lawsuit"); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185
F.R.D. 230, 242-45 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (declining to certify a class alleging a pattern
and practice of discrimination because of "the very high risk of a preclusive effect of
[a] class action judgment" on the absent class members' damages claims for intentional discrimination); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 453-55
(Tex. 2007) (declining to read Cooperas "an exception from resjudicata principles for
claims abandoned as unsuitable for class treatment"). For a critique of this "posture
of vague powerlessness toward preclusion problems," see Wolff, supra note 14, at
744-46, 776. For criticism of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Daccach, see
Steve Gardner, Texas Supreme Court: Puttingthe Squeeze on Class Actions?, CONSUMER L.
& POL'Y BLOG (Mar. 5, 2007, 2:35 PM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2007/
03/texassupremec.html.
27 See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 876-78; 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14,
§ 4455, at 460-61; Wasserman, supra note 14, at 489.
28 Cooper, 467 U.S. at 878.
29 Accord Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1290-94 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the plaintiffs claims were not barred by issue preclusion because the issue was never
adjudicated when it was raised in the class action).
30 See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 880-84; see also, e.g., Mufloz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 307
(5th Cir. 2000) ("[T]hat the failure of proof on the class claim does not bar all individual class members from bringing their own suits, provided that they do not base
their claims solely on issues already adjudicated in this action and that they can show
individualized proof of discrimination." (citing Cooper, 467 U.S. at 880)); Isby v.
Wright, 104 F.3d 362, 1996 WL 735595, at *1 (7th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (stating that the court would entertain the individual damages claims of class
members where the class action had sought only injunctive relief); In re Jackson
Lockdown/MCO Cases, 568 F. Supp. 869, 890-93 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (permitting indi-
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Thus, it implicitly assumed that claim preclusion did not bar the
absent class members' individual claims, thereby adopting a gloss on
3
the doctrine of claim preclusion for class actions. '
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper have elaborated on this
class action gloss:
The basic effort to limit class adjudication as close as possible to
matters common to members of the class frequently requires that
nonparticipating members of the class remain free to pursue individual actions that would be merged or barred by claim preclusion
had a prior individual action been brought for the relief demanded
in the class action.... [ Cooperand o]ther cases provide equally clear
illustrations of the need to adjust claim-preclusion rules to distinguish between the rules that apply to individual actions and the
rules that apply to class actions. So an individual who has suffered
particular injury as a result of practices enjoined in a class action
should remain free to seek a damages remedy even though claim
preclusion would defeat a second action had the first action been
32
an individual suit for the same injunctive relief.

Similarly, if a class action is defined narrowly to pursue only specific remedies or to press only certain theories or to litigate only designated issues, "individual actions remain available to pursue any other
'33
questions that were expressly excluded from the class action.
vidual class members to pursue damages claims following a class action that had
sought only declaratory and injunctive relief);Jahn ex rel.Jahn v. ORCR, Inc., 92 P.3d
984, 985 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) ("[T]he doctrine of claim preclusion does not bar
unnamed members of a class seeking injunctive relief... from bringing claims for
damages in subsequent litigation."); cf Wolff, supra note 14, at 727 (noting "some
tension between the Court's assertion that 'basic principles of res judicata (merger
and bar or claim preclusion) ... apply' in a class action and the actual holding of the
case" (alteration in original) (quoting Cooper, 467 U.S. at 874)).
31 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 490 (using the phrase "class action gloss").
32 18A WRIGHT, MILLER& COOPER, supranote 14, § 4455, at 461-62; see also Wolff,
supra note 14, at 742 ("Most F2 courts [are willing] to entertain individual claims that
could not have been litigated on a classwide basis in an earlier proceeding.").
33 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4455, at 465-66 (foomote
omitted); see also Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009, 1017-20 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that where the certification order made clear that class-wide monetary relief was
not contemplated, "no order in this case prevents a claim" by absent class members
for back pay); Hiser, 94 F.3d at 1291-92 (recognizing that "a class action suit seeking
only declaratory and injunctive relief does not bar subsequent individual damage
claims by class members, even if based on the same events" and adding that a followup class action alleging a distinct access to court claim was not precluded by the prior
class action judgment because it arose out of "a different set of operative facts"); cf.
Reppert v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 56-58 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that ajudgment approving the settlement of a nationwide class action for money
damages precluded an individual action alleging the same product defect even
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Courts certifying class actions may consider the potential preclusive
effects of their judgments and explicitly seek to constrain them to suit
34
the needs of the particular proceeding.
A variety of factors counsel in favor of the class action gloss or
limited preclusive effects for class action judgments. First, while it
may be efficient to bring a class action seeking class-wide relief-to
seek an injunction against a pattern of discrimination, for examplein some cases it may not be efficient or even possible to pursue other
forms of relief, such as money damages, in the context of a class
action. 3 5 If the judgment in a class action that pursued only injunctive
relief were to preclude follow-up individual damage actions arising
out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions, then
the class members might feel compelled to intervene in the class

though the individual plaintiff raised a different legal theory); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. c (1982) ("[T]he representative of a class is constituted
with reference to specific litigation and has authority only as to matters pertinent to
it."); id. § 42 illus. 4 (concluding that a judgment against a class that had alleged
racial discrimination in employment would not preclude an individual action alleging
sex discrimination).
34 See Wolff, supra note 14, at 764-66, 770-76; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 26(1) (b) ("[T]he general rule [against claim splitting] does not apply to
extinguish the claim [if] ... [t]he court in the first action has expressly reserved the
plaintiffs right to maintain the second action."). Professor Wolff writes in terms of
the "constraints" that a rendering court may impose upon the preclusive effects of a
class action judgment. See Wolff, supra note 14, at 720-76.
35 See, e.g., Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 409 (5th Cir. 1978) (declining to preclude individual damage suits and citing the "lack of common questions of fact as to
many of those claims, and the unmanageability of the suit had they been included").
Rule 23(b) (3) permits certification only if "the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (3). Courts have denied certification where individual issues, such as reliance, assumption of risk, length of exposure, or damages,
predominate over the common questions. See, e.g., Grovatt v. St. Jude Med., Inc. (In
re St.Jude Med., Inc.), 522 F.3d 836, 838-42 (8th Cir. 2008) (reversing a certification
order in a class action seeking damages and medical monitoring because the individual issues of causation and reliance predominated); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 190 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of class
certification where "ascertaining which class members have sustained injury means
individual issues predominate over common ones"); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A] fraud class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an issue."); see also Wasserman, supra note 14, at 490 ("Because
'individual' claims would present many individual issues, it would be difficult or
impossible to raise them in the context of the class action while still satisfying the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b) (3) or the more stringent requirements of
(b)(1) or (b)(2).").
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action to pursue their damage claims, thereby frustrating the purpose
of Rule 23.36
Second, due process may require a more constrained approach
to preclusion in the class action context. Rule 23 does not guarantee
absent class members in class actions certified under Rule 23(b) (1) or
(b) (2) notice or the opportunity to opt oUt.3 7 Yet the Supreme Court
has recognized that a court may "bind an absent plaintiff concerning a
claim for money damages" only if it "provide[s] minimal procedural
due process protection," including (1) "notice plus an opportunity to
be heard and participate in the litigation"; (2) "an opportunity to
remove himself [or herself] from the class by executing and returning
an

'opt

out'

.

.

.

form";

and

(3)

"at all

times adequate[]

represent[ation]."38 Thus, it may be unconstitutional to preclude
individual damage claims unless the absent class members (or at least
those lacking minimum contacts with the forum state) were afforded
notice and an opportunity to opt out of the class action.3 9 Since class
members in (b) (1) and (b) (2) class actions are often denied notice
and the opportunity to opt out, courts apply the class action gloss and
36 See, e.g., Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984) (stating that if
the class action judgment precluded individual claims for money damages, "it would
be tantamount to requiring that every member of the class be permitted to intervene
to litigate the merits of his [or her] individual claim," thereby frustrating the purposes
of Rule 23);Jahn ex rel.Jahn v. ORCR, Inc., 92 P.3d 984, 992 (Colo. 2004) (en banc)
("C.R.C.P. 23(b)(2) ... does not preclude unnamed class members from bringing
subsequent actions for damages."); see also Wasserman, supra note 14, at 489 (noting
that preclusion of individual damages claims would be at odds with the purposes of
Rule 23).
37 In class actions certified under Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2), "the court may direct
appropriate notice to the class." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (2) (A). In class actions certified
under Rule 23(b) (3), on the other hand, "the court must direct to class members the
best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort," including notice "that
the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B) (v).
38 Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 -12 (1985) (citing Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940)).
39 See, e.g., Brown v. Ticor Tide Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating
that due process requires an opportunity to opt out if monetary claims are involved);
Gates v. Towery, 456 F. Supp. 2d 953, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ("Absent class members
seeking non -incidental money damages may only be barred by resjudicataif they have
been afforded notice and an opportunity to opt out...." (citingJefferson v. Ingersoll
Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999); Tice v. Am. Airlines, 162 F.3d 966, 972
(7th Cir. 1998); Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 966, 1008 (7th Cir. 1982))). Professor
Bassett argues that it may violate due process to bind absent class members unless
they affirmatively opt in. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away: Representation, Due Pro-

cess, and Preclusionin Class Actions, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1079, 1118-25.
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decline to preclude individual follow-up actions seeking money
damages.

40

Third and related, the class representative's authority to
represent the absentees is limited: "[t] he most fundamental principles
underlying class actions limit the powers of the representative parties
to the claims they possess in common with other members of the
class." 41 If absent class members have claims or suffer damages that
were not pursued in the class action, courts decline to preclude the
absentees from pressing those claims or seeking that relief in a followup action because the class representative's authority was circumscribed and she would not have adequately represented claimants on
matters she did not purport to pursue. 42 Thus, strong policy considerations counsel in favor of the class action gloss, which limits the
preclusive effects of class action judgments.
B.

Claim Preclusive Effects of Class Action Settlements

If the claim preclusive effects of class action judgments do not
fully protect American defendants from individual follow-up lawsuits,
it is important to note that class action settlements (rather than litigated
judgments) afford significantly greater protection from relitigation.
In particular, American courts often approve and enforce settlements
that release defendants from liability not only for the claims alleged in
the class action complaint, but also for related claims that were not
specifically pleaded. 43 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals initially
40

See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 851-52 (9th Cir. 2000)

(stating that the damages claims of the class were not precluded where class members
in the prior action had not been afforded adequate notice or an opportunity to opt

out); Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing due process
concerns in light of the lack of "clear warning that individual claims may be lost");
Brown, 982 F.2d at 392 ("Because Brown had no opportunity to opt out ... there
would be a violation of minimal due process if [his] damage claims were held barred
by res judicata."); see also 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4455, at
468-71 (discussing the circumstances in which "[n]otice requirements peculiar to
class actions may .

.

. defeat preclusion").

41 Nat'l Super Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 16 (2d Cir. 1981);
see also Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962) (per curiam) ("[Would-be class
representatives] cannot represent a class of whom they are not a part." (citing
McCabe v. Atchison, T.S.F.R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 162-63 (1914))).
42 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4455, at 459; see supranote 33
(regarding RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 42); see also Wolff, supra note 14,
at 731-32, 774-75 (discussing the potential for conflicts of interest within a potential
class).
43 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 107 (2d Cir.
2005) ("[C]lass action releases may include claims not presented and even those
which could not have been presented as long as the released conduct arises out of the
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expressed skepticism about this practice, stating, "If a judgment after
trial cannot extinguish claims not asserted in the class action complaint, ajudgment approving a settlement in such an action ordinarily
should not be able to do so either."44 But recognizing that class
actions will not settle unless the defendant can secure broad protection from related lawsuits, 45 even the Second Circuit has permitted
the "release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that
underlying the claims in the settled class action even though the claim
was not presented and might not have been presentable in the class
action" 4 6 as long as "the released claims [were] adequately represented prior to settlement." 47 Other courts, too, have approved class
'identical factual predicate' as the settled conduct." (quoting TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W.
Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982))); Bernadelli v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co.
(In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig.), 357 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2004)
("There is no impropriety in including in a settlement a description of claims that is
somewhat broader than those that have been specifically pleaded. In fact, most settling defendants insist on this."); Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1287
(9th Cir. 1992) ("[A] federal court may release not only those claims alleged in the
complaint, but also a claim 'based on the identical factual predicate.. . .'" (quoting
TBK Partners,Ltd., 675 F.2d at 460)); TBK Partners,Ltd., 675 F.2d at 460 ("[A] court
may permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that
underlying the claims in the settled class action even though the claim was not
presented and might not have been presentable in the class action.").
44 Nat'l Super Spuds, 660 F.2d at 18 (rejecting a settlement that would have
impaired the prosecution of claims not asserted by the class and not resting upon the
identical factual predicate); see also Zomber v. Christies, Inc. (In re Auction Houses
Antitrust Litig.), 42 Fed. App'x 511, 519 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[S]ince Super Spuds, we have
never affirmed the approval of a class action settlement which included the uncompensated impairment of non-class claims unless the non-class claims were based on
the identicalfactual predicate as the class claims." (citing Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698
F.2d 61, 77 (2d Cir. 1982); TBK Partners, Ltd., 675 F.2d at 460-61).
45 See, e.g.,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 107 n.13 (discussing several circuit
court opinions that weigh the merits of the identical factual predicate doctrine);
Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62
VAND. L. REv. 179, 206-07 (2009); Nagareda, supra note 3, at 11-13.
46 TBK Partners,Ltd., 675 F.2d at 460; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 107
("[C]lass action releases may include claims not presented and even those which
could not have been presented as long as the released conduct arises out of the 'identical factual predicate' as the settled conduct." (quoting TBKPartners,Ltd., 675 F.2d at
460)); Nat'l Super Spuds, 660 F.2d at 18 n.7 ("[A]ssum[ing] that a settlement could
properly be framed so as to prevent class members from subsequently asserting claims
relying on a legal theory different from that relied upon in the class action complaint
but depending upon the very same set of facts.").
47 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 106. The Second Circuit has rejected settlements that purport to release claims that "depend not only upon a different legal
theory but upon proof of further facts." Nat'l Super Spuds, 660 F.2d at 18 n.7; see also
In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 42 Fed. App'x at 519 (rejecting a settlement that
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action settlements that released claims not presented in the class
48
action as long as the claims arose out of the same factual predicate.
Some courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 49 have even
approved or enforced settlements that released claims that could not
have been brought in the F1 court because that court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain them (or for other reasons) .50
To summarize, then, in class actions that are litigated to judgment, the class action gloss may permit absent class members to pursue some transactionally related individual actions notwithstanding a
judgment against the class. But in the substantial majority of certified
class actions that settlef I the judicially approved settlement agreewould have impaired the prosecution of claims not asserted by the class and not resting upon the identical factual predicate).
48 See, e.g., Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir.
2006) ("[R]elease encompasses Plaintiffs' claims if they arise from an identical factual
predicate as the claims asserted by the... class."); In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 357 F.3d
at 803-05 (concluding that an absent class member who had not opted out was
barred from suing the insurer for a particular billing practice where the class action
release and notice thereof covered all "policy charges" and "premium charges"); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[A]
judgment pursuant to a class settlement can bar later claims based on the allegations
underlying the claims in the settled class action. This is true even though the precluded claim was not presented, and could not have been presented, in the class
action itself." (citing TBK Partners,Ltd., 675 F.2d at 460)).
49 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375-79 (1996) (concluding that a Delaware court would afford preclusive effect to a class action settlementjudgment that purported to release claims that could not have been adjudicated
by the state court because they were within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction).
50 See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1564 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[A] state court has the power to enter a settlement negotiated by the parties as a
judgment which releases exclusive federal claims that the state court could not itself
entertain."); Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1287 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[A] federal court may release not only those claims alleged in the complaint, but
also a claim 'based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in
the settled class action even though the claim was not presented and might not have
been presentable in the class action.'" (quoting TBK Partners,Ltd., 675 F.2d at 460)); cf In
re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 200 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that
Alabama law "require[s] jurisdictional competency as a condition to the preclusive
bite of resjudicata" and holding that a state court judgment approving a settlement
that purported to release claims within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction would
not preclude the federal claims).
51 A significant majority of certified class actions are settled rather than tried. See
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS
ACTION

FAIRNESS

Acr

ON

THE

FEDERAL

COURTS

2 (2008), available at http://

www.fc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafall08.pdf/$file/cafallO8.pdf (finding, in a
sample of diversity class actions filed before enactment of the Class Action Fairness
Act, that "all class actions in which a class was certified, whether for litigation or settle-
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ment may be crafted to provide the defendant with significant protection from follow-up claims by individual absent class members.
C. Issue Preclusive Effects of Class Action Judgments
Even if the class action gloss permits absent class members to pursue some transactionally-related individual actions, the defendant may
be able to preserve its victory by invoking issue preclusion to bind the
absentees by findings on particular issues decided against the class.
Ordinarily, a valid and final judgment precludes relitigation by the
parties of any issue that was actually litigated and decided, even if the
second litigation presents a different claim. 52 Absent class members
who decline to opt out of the class action typically are treated as "parties" for these purposes, whether the class wins or loses. 53 If the class

is unsuccessful, then the class action judgment bars absent class members who did not opt out from seeking to relitigate "any issue actually
litigated and determined, if its determination was essential to that
judgment. '54 As Wright, Miller, and Kane put it, " [t]he obvious implication of Rule 23(c) (3)55 is that anyone properly listed in the judgment purposes, ended with class settlements"); Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R.
Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Dfference Does It
Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 591, 647 (2006) (stating that "almost all certified class
actions settle," including most class actions that are certified for trial and litigation);
Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges,71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 180 (1996) (showing that in the four federal district
courts examined, certified class actions were resolved by court-approved settlement in
62%, 100%, 71%, and 88% respectively).
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact
or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.").
53 See id.
54 Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984); see also, e.g., In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir.
2003) (stating that absent class members were bound by the determination that a
national class action was not tenable); Isby v. Wright, 104 F.3d 362, 1996 WL 735595,
at *1 (7th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (stating that a class member in an
action that challenged prison policies "may not relitigate the same issues" in his individual action for damages); McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1523 (D.
Mass. 1985) ("[Aill rulings of substantive law made [in a class action] between class
certification and decertification are binding on plaintiff as a class member and may
not be relitigated in the instant case."); Wolff, supra note 14, at 737 ("An unfavorable
result in the equitable proceeding . . . threatens to preclude class members from
litigating their damages claims in individual suits.").
55 Rule 23(c)(3) requires that the judgment in a 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class
"describes those whom the court finds to be class members" and the judgment in a
23(b) (3) class describes those to whom notice was directed who have not opted out
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ment should be bound by it absent some special reason for not doing
1
so."56 Thus, even if individual class members remain free to pursue
individual claims for relief that were not presented in the class action,
they nevertheless may be bound by determinations made against the
class on issues necessary to support the judgment against the class. As
Professor Wolff explains, American courts are "fairly consistent in
their reactions, generally rejecting expansive claim preclusion
defenses but entertaining issue preclusion arguments more
seriously.

57

But even if courts are more inclined to apply issue preclusion
than claim preclusion to bind absent class members by judgments
against the class, issue preclusion is of limited utility to defendants in
the substantial majority of class actions that are settled rather than
tried. 58 A class action may be settled or voluntarily dismissed only with
the court's approval, and for the settlement to be binding on the class
members, the court must find that it is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 59 In making this determination, however, the court does not
adjudicate the issues raised in the class action complaint on the merits.' 0 Yet a standard requirement of issue preclusion is that the issue
was "actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judg-

and "whom the court finds to be class members." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). The certifying court's Rule 23(c) (3) descriptions should aid the F2 court that is ultimately
called upon to determine the binding effect of the class action judgment. See 7AA
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 14, § 1789, at 556.
56 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 14, § 1789, at 553. On the other
hand, class members who opt out of a class action are not bound by the class action
judgment. See id. § 4455, at 457. Therefore, if an absent class member opts out and
then files an individual suit raising an issue that was decided against the class, the
defendant may not invoke issue preclusion to bar the opt-out plaintiff from relitigating the issue. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone,333 F.3d at 769; In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 1985); see also AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07 cmt. g (2010) ("[I] ndividual
claimants who exit receive neither the benefit nor the detriment of the preclusive
effect exerted by the judgment in the class action."). It may well be, as Professor
Wolff argues, that permitting issue preclusion in cases where only some class members have high-value damage claims would exacerbate intraclass conflicts. See Wolff,
supra note 14, at 774-76. He suggests that F1 courts in such cases need to consider
entering an order that any judgment in the class action would have no preclusive
effect "beyond the final resolution of the claims actually raised therein." Id. at 776.
57 Wolff, supra note 14, at 741.
58 See supra note 51.
59 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(2).
60

See 18A

WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,

supra note 14, § 4443, at 257.
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ment."6 1 As a comment to the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments makes
clear, "[i]n the case of a judgment entered by... consent ... , none
of the issues is actually litigated. ' 62 Thus, ordinarily a judicially
63
approved settlement has no issue preclusive effect.
Another comment to the Restatement goes on to note that a judgment entered by consent "may be conclusive.., with respect to one or
more issues, if the parties have entered an agreement manifesting
such an intention." 64 But Wright, Miller, and Cooper posit that "consent agreements ordinarily are intended to preclude any further litigation on the claim presented but are not intended to preclude further
litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus consent judgments
65
ordinarily support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion."
In sum, when a class action is resolved by a trial on the merits, the
judgment likely will have issue preclusive effect, but its claim preclusive effect will be tempered by the class action gloss. On the other
hand, in the substantial majority of certified class actions that settle,
the judgment approving the settlement will have limited, if any, issue
preclusive effect, but it will provide robust protection against the prosecution of individual follow-up suits arising out of the same factual
predicate as the claims raised in the class action. In follow-up actions,
absent class members may be able to avoid the preclusive effects of
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see also id. § 27 cmt. d (stating that an issue is "actually litigated" when it is "properly raised, by the pleadings or
otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined").
62 Id. § 27 cmt. e; accord 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4443, at
256-57 ("IT] he central characteristic of a consent judgment is that the court has not
actually resolved the substance of the issues presented.").
63 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) ("[S]ettlements ordinarily occasion no issue preclusion ....unless it is clear.., that the parties intend their
agreement to have such an effect."); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Chevron, USA, Inc.,
400 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2005); Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d
1240, 1245-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
64

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e; accord 18A WRIGHT,MILLER

supra note 14, § 4443, at 262 ("[P]reclusive effects [of consent decrees]
should be measured by the intent of the parties." (footnote omitted)); cf.In re Halpern, 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (l1th Cir. 1987) (applying issue preclusion where "the
& COOPER,

parties intended that the consent judgment operate as a final adjudication of the
factual issues contained therein").

65 See 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 4443, at 265 (discussing
United States v. Int'l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1953)). Where, however, class
members appear before the F1 court, objecting to the settlement and questioning
whether or not it releases related claims pending elsewhere, they are bound, as a
matter of issue preclusion, by the F1 court's determination that the claims are
released. See, e.g., Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 745-47 (9th

Cir. 2006).
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class action judgments if they are able to establish that the notice provided was inadequate or that they were not adequately represented in
the class action. 66 But, even if class action defendants in American
courts are not fully protected from follow-up individual suits, preclusion doctrine affords them meaningful protections.
Now that we have gained a better understanding of the protections that American preclusion law affords class action defendants, we
turn to the preclusion law of the participating European countries to
gauge the risk that American class action judgments will not preclude
repetitive litigation abroad. A project of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) casts significant light on this
issue.
II.

THE PRECLUsivE EFFECTS OF GROUP LITIGATION JUDGMENTS
IN EUROPE

A.

BIICL and Its Judgments Project

BIICL is a premier research center, located in London, which

promotes the understanding, development, and practical application
of international and comparative law through its research projects,
publications, programs, training, and advisory activities. 67 In April
2007, BIICL undertook a project, commissioned by the European
Commission (EC), entitled "The Effect in the European Community
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: Recognition, ResJudicata and Abuse of Process" ("BIICL Judgments Project" or the "Pro66 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); see also Nagareda, supra
note 3, at 17-19, 43-48 (decrying the use of the imprecise phrase "adequate representation at all times," which embraces both structural and performance defects); Wasserman, supra note 14, at 494-97 (discussing the willingness of the courts to allow
parties to relitigate the issue of adequacy). There is widespread debate on whether a
judgment may be collaterally attacked for inadequacy of representation if the rendering court already found that the representation was adequate. Compare In re Diet
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that no collateral
review is available when class members have already received a "full and fair hearing"), with Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257-59 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting collateral attack by the plaintiffs who sought "only to prevent the prior
settlement from operating as resjudicata to their claims"), affd by an equally divided
Court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). This debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
67 See Robert McCorquodale, Director'sForeword, BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMP.
L., http://www.biicl.org/director (last visited Nov. 29, 2010); see alsoJACOB VAN DE
VELDEN

& JUSTINE STEFANELLI, BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMP. LAw, COMPARATIVE

REPORT: THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COM-

5 (2008) [hereinafter BIICL REPORT], available at http://www.biicl.org/files/4608-comparativereport_--jls_2006_fpc_21_-_final.pdf (providing an overview of the BIICL).
MERCIAL MA-TERs: RECOGNITION, REsJUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS
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ject").68 In proposing the study, BIICL noted that while the Brussels/
Lugano Regime 69 calls for mutual recognition of Member State judgments "without any special procedure being required," 70 the focus of
attention in the European Union has been on the enforcement ofjudg-

68

BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITIONS, Res Judicata and
Abuse of Process (2008) [hereinafter DESCRIPTION OF THE BIICLJUDGMENTS PROJECT],

available at http://www.biicl.org/files/2974_descriptionof the-project.pdf . For a
more complete description of the project, see BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 5-9.
69 The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, as amended, 1998 OJ. (L 27) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention], was signed by France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy in 1968 and came into force in those countries in 1973.
SeeJUSTIN

NEWTON, THE UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CON-

6 (2002). Formal alterations to the Convention occurred upon the accession of Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria,
Sweden, and Finland. See id.; BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 36. The Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, as amended, 1998 OJ. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano Convention], was signed in 1988 and came into force in 1992, linking the parties to the
Brussels Convention with certain member states of the European Free Trade Association, including Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. See NEWTON, supra, at 9; BIICL
REPORT, supra note 67, at 37. Poland later acceded to the Lugano Convention. See
NEWTON, supra,at 9. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels Regulation], has largely supplanted and modernized the Brussels Convention. See NEWTON, supra, at 17-21; BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 36. A revised
Lugano II Convention, Oct. 30, 2007, 2007 OJ. (L 339) 3 [hereinafter Lugano II
Convention], was signed in 2007 and ratified by the European Community in May
2009. It entered into force between the European Community and Norway in January
2010 and will extend the reach of the Brussels/Lugano Regime to eleven new European Union Member States. See Beat Sch6nenberger, Revision of the Lugano Convention, Swiss FED. DEP'T JUST. & POLICE, http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home/
themen/wirtschaft/ref internationales-privatrecht/reflugano-uebereinkommen/
ref_0.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2010). The term "Brussels/Lugano Regime" refers to
the system for the recognition and enforcement of judgments implemented by the
Brussels Regulation and these Conventions. The term "Member States" herein refers
to members of the European Union and to Switzerland, which, while not a member
of the European Union, is a Contracting State to the Lugano Convention. See BIICL
REPORT, supra note 67, at 37.
70 Brussels Regulation, supra note 69, art. 33(1), 2000 OJ. (C 12) at 19 ("Ajudgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without
any special procedure being required."); Lugano Convention, supra note 69, art. 26,
1998 OJ. (L 319) ("[A] judgment given in a Contracting State shall be recognized in
the other Contracting States without any special procedures being required.");
Lugano II Convention, supra note 69, art. 33(1), 2007 O.J. (L 339) ("[A] judgment
given in a State bound by this Convention shall be recognised in the other States
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ments rather than on their preclusive effects.71 The Project under-

took to "redress that balance," to ascertain the extent to which foreign
judgments are given preclusive effect, and to determine whether there
are any "obstacles to the free movement of judgments in the EC, and
(in turn) the proper functioning of the internal market, and whether
such obstacles may be effectively addressed through the development
72
of EC-wide rules in this area."
BIICL recognized that it first needed a clear understanding of the
preclusive effects of domestic judgments in the national courts of the
participating European countries. 73 Accordingly, BIICL retained
national rapporteurs to prepare reports on the preclusive effects of
judgments in seven European Union (EU) Member States (the
United Kingdom (England and Wales), the Netherlands, Germany,
France, Romania, Spain, and Sweden) and two states that are not part
of the European Union (Switzerland and the United States).74 BIICL

prepared an extensive questionnaire that each national rapporteur
was to follow in preparing a national report. The questionnaire completed by the national rapporteurs for the EU Member States and
Switzerland (collectively referred to as the "participating European
countries") elicited information on the binding character of judgments and the types of judgments that are capable of having preclusive effects, domestic claim preclusion doctrine, domestic issue
75
preclusion doctrine, domestic doctrine on "wider preclusive effects,"
71 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 5.
72 DESCRIPTION OF THE BIICLJUDGMENrrS PROJECT, supranote 68, at 2. The BIICL
Report described the Project's objectives somewhat more narrowly:
[Tihe study does not consider whether disparities between the Member
State rules create any impediment to the functioning of the principle of
mutual recognition, nor does it analyse whether any EC-wide solution to
such problems is desirable and viable. Its main objective is rather to provide
the necessary substantive basis for the ... discussion of how litigants can be
protected, the consistency of legal orders maintained, and civil justice
resource economy ensured by ensuring the finality and effectiveness ofjudgments throughout the EU.
BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 6.

73 BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 6.
74 Switzerland was included in part because it permitted "insight into the implementation in practice of the Lugano Convention." Id. The United States was
included because it "allow[ed] the drawing of informative and constructive parallels
between the legal systems of the EU and the US." Id. The original plans for the
BIICL Judgments Project contemplated a report to be prepared by a national rapporteur for Poland, but no reference to a Polish report was made in the BIICL
Report. See id.
75 The phrase "wider preclusive effects" refers to preclusion rules other than
claim or issue preclusion: "[T]hese wider preclusive effects (where they exist) are
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the preclusive effects of Member State judgments within the Brussels/
Lugano Regime, and the preclusive effects of judgments of countries
that are neither Member States nor Contracting States to the Lugano
Convention, referred to as "third states." 76 The questionnaire completed by the national rapporteur for the United States was necessarily
somewhat different, omitting questions about the treatment of Member State judgments and instead soliciting information on the preclusive effects of sister state judgments and judgments of foreign
countries. 77 Among a host of other issues, the questionnaires sought
to determine whether, under each country's domestic preclusion law,
judgments rendered in class actions or representative actions have
78
preclusive effects that extend to absent class members.
Following completion of the national reports, BIICL prepared a
comparative table that summarized and compared the national
reports. 7 9 After receiving feedback on the comparative table from the
national rapporteurs, BIlCL then prepared a comparative report
("Report" or "BIICL Report") summarizing the Project's findings,
which it submitted to the European Commission in late April 2008.80
The Report, prepared by Jacob van de Velden 81 and Justine Stefanelli, 82 identified both the similarities and differences among the pregenerally considered not to derive from the effect of ajudgment, but rather from the
conduct of parties prior to, during and following proceedings." Id. The concept of
wider preclusive effects will be addressed infra Part II.B.2.
76 See BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, QUESTIONNAIRE: THE EFFECT IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (2006)
[hereinafter QUESTIONNAIRE] (on file with the author); see also BIICL REPORT, supra
note 67, at 7 (discussing the structure of the study).
77 See UNITED STATES QUESTIONNAIRE: THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION, Res Judicata, and
Abuse of Process (2007) [hereinafter UNITED STATES QUESTIONNAIRE] (on file with
the author).
78 QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 76, at III.B.9, III.C.7, III.D.7; UNITED STATES QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 77, at II.A.8, II.B.8, II.C.8.

79

BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, COMPARATIVE TABLE: THE EFFECT OF REC-

OGNITION OFJUDGMENTS

(2008) [hereinafter BIICL COMPARATIVE

TABLE] (on

file with

author).
80 See BIICL REPORT, supranote 67, at 7-8 (describing the implementation of the
study).
81 Jacob van de Velden is an assistant professor at the University of Groningen in
the Netherlands. While Director of the Private International Law Programme at
BIICL, he served as the Project Director for the BIICL Judgments Project and as the
national rapporteur for the Netherlands.
82 Justine Stefanelli is a Research Fellow at BIICL. She served as the Project
Research Fellow for the BIICL Judgments Project and as the national rapporteur for
the United States. Ms. Stefanelli, whom I had the pleasure of teaching in 2003 and
2004, is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
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their willingness to
clusion doctrines of the countries surveyed and
83
judgments.
foreign
to
extend preclusive effect
Since the ultimate objective of the Article is to assess the magnitude of the risk that American class action judgments will have limited
or no preclusive effect in Europe, we will focus on those aspects of the
Report that relate to the preclusive effect of class action or group litigation judgments. First, though, we must examine salient differences
between the preclusion doctrine widely prevailing in the United
States, on the one hand, and the doctrines employed by courts in the
participating European countries, on the other. Just as the preclusion
doctrines of individual American states differ from one another in
meaningful ways-for example, some states reject the mutuality
requirement, while others retain it-so, too, do the preclusion doctrines of the participating European countries differ from one
another and from "standard" American preclusion doctrine. It is to
these differences that we now turn.
B.

Salient Differences Between European and American Preclusion
Doctrine

1. Scope of the Claim
Pursuant to the doctrine of claim preclusion, a valid and final
judgment bars parties to the litigation from relitigating the same
claim in a collateral proceeding.8 4 While all nine countries surveyed
in the BIICLJudgments Project accord claim preclusive effect tojudgments, 85 they do not employ a shared definition of the scope of the

claim or the claim preclusive effect.
In determining whether the claim presented in two lawsuits is the
86
same, many American courts apply a transactional test. England and

Wales and the Netherlands, like the United States, deem claims to be
the same as long as "there is an identity of the factual cause of
83 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67.
84 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18-20 (1982). The Restatement
(Second) ofJudgments eschews the term "on the merits," id. § 19 cmt. a, but acknowledges exceptions to the general claim preclusion rule for certain judgments, such as

dismissals for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue or for voluntary dismissals without prejudice, id. § 20.
85 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 15 & n.33.

86 See supra note 16; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 ("[T]he
claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.").
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action." 87 The Dutch Report provides, for example, that "[p]arties
are bound by a court's finding on the claim in a previous judgment,
even if they are able to present new facts or evidence after the first
judgment acquired res judicata status, and even if a different legal
cause of action is put forward in the second proceedings." 88 Similarly,
the Report of England and Wales provides that "a 'cause of action'
should be seen as being no more than the set of facts which entitles
the claimant to seek a particular remedy against the defendant. The
remedy itself, and the legal basis for it, thus provide no part of the
'cause of action' for these purposes."8 9 Moreover, a valid and final
judgment
precludes re-litigation of a cause of action not only with respect to
points actually decided, expressly or by necessary inference, but also
points which might have been but were not raised and decided in
the earlier proceedings for the purpose of establishing or refuting
90
the existence of the cause of action.

It appears that Spain, too, focuses on the underlying facts in determining whether or not claim preclusion applies.9 1 In fact, "in a situation
87

BIICL

REPORT,

supra note 67, at 16; see also ANDREW DICKINSON, BRITISH INST.
EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN

OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, THE

CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION, RESJUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS:

21 (2008) [hereinafter REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES] (on file
with author) ("To determine whether a second action involves the 'same cause of
action' as the first, the Court inquires whether the same set of facts which entitled the
claimant to an action in the first action underlie the second action."); JUSTINE N.
ENGLAND AND WALES

STEFANELLI, BRITISH INST. OF INT'L

&

COMP. LAW, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN CoM-

MUNITY OFJUDGMENTS IN CIVL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION, RESJuDICATA
AND ABUSE OF PROCESS: UNITED STATES

19 (2008) [hereinafter

REPORT OF THE UNITED

STATES] (on file with author) (describing the Second Restatement's transactional test);
JACOB VAN DE VELDEN, BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMP. LAw, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION,
RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS: THE NETHERLANDS

REPORT OF

THE NETHERLANDS]

42 (2008) [hereinafter

(on file with author) ("The requirement for having the

same claim ... concerns the identity of the factual cause of action of the relief claimed.
It does not refer to the legal cause of action, nor to the type of relief claimed.").
88 REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 37.
89 REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 22.
90 Id. at 24 (describing "cause of action estoppel").
91 See ALEGRIA BoRRAs RODRIGUEZ & ESTHER RIVERA, BRITISH INST. OF INT'L &
COMP. LAW, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNITION, RESJUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS: SPAIN 28

(2008) [hereinafter REPORT OF SPAIN] (on file with author) (stating that courts
"should compare the essential facts or title which underlie the basis of the claim to
determine if the same cause of action is in issue.... [A]II facts making up the claim
which it was possible to argue up to the last moment of preclusion and declarations as
to the existence of legal relations are covered.").

2011]

INTERJURISDICTIONAL

PRECLUSION

where a claim could have been based on various sets of facts, then,
even if the Claimant only opts for one of them, all claims based on all
' 92
[permutations] of the facts are covered.

Germany and Switzerland, on the other hand, "require[ ] an
identity of the factual cause of action and the relief claimed."9 3 As the
Report of Germany puts it, "the binding effects of German judgments
extends only to the procedural claims (Streitgegenstand) [i.e., the
demand] which the parties lay before the court to decide, not to those
claims which could have been raised or which may have arisen out of
the same transaction or occurrence." 94 Thus, if a plaintiff involved in
a car accident sues only for damages for personal injury (and not for
property damage) or only for damages for certain personal injuries,
she will not be barred from later seeking damages for property damage or even for the remaining personal injuries.9 5 Similarly, in Switzerland, the claim is limited by the amount claimed in the prayer for
relief.9 6 According to the Report of Switzerland, "[t] his view leads to a
rather narrow concept of identical claims." 97 Although narrower than

the general transactional approach applied by many American juris92 Id.
93 BIICL

REPORT,

supra note 67, at 16; see also CHRISTIAN A. HEINZE,

BRITISH INST.

OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATrERS: RECOGNITION, RESJUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS:

28 (2008) [hereinafter REPORT OF GERMANY] (on file with author) ("The
preclusive effects of judgments is limited to . . . : (1) the specific request for relief
sought by the Claimant ... and (2) the essential facts which the Claimant would have
established to obtain the relief in default of the Defendant's appearance .... ."); PAUL
OBERHAMMER & URS H. HOFFMAN-Nowotny, BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, THE
GERMANY

EFFcE-

IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIL

TERS: RECOGNITION,

[hereinafter

RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE

REPORT OF SWITZERLAND]

OF PROCESS:

AND COMMERCIAL MATSWITZERLAND

16 (2008)

(on file with author) ("[T]he prevailing theory

among scholars is to consider the prayers for relief.., along with the factual circumstances ... from which the claimed rights emerge .... "); id. at 17 (stating that the
Federal Supreme Court has opined that "identical claims must be assumed, if the
claimant brings the same action 'based on the same legal grounds' . . . and the same
factual circumstances before the courts for a second time" (citing Bundesgericht
[BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 5, 2006, 5C.78/2006 (Switz.); BGer Nov. 17,
2004, 4C.314/2004 (Switz.); BGerJan. 22, 2003, 4C.138/2002 (Switz.); BGerJan. 15,

1997, 123

ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS

[BGE] III 16, 18

(Switz.); BGer Nov. 3, 1995, 121 BGE III 474, 477 (Switz.))).
94 REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 18 (citing PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF
STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE

95

See id. at 21.

96

REPORT OF SWITZERLAND,

357 (2004)).
supra note 93, at 18 & n.170 (citing BGer Nov. 15,

2000, 4C.233/2000 (Switz.)).
97 Id. at 18. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland has not yet decided
whether "the same claim is further limited by the substantive legal basis." Id. at 16.
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dictions, the German and Swiss approach appears consistent with the

class action gloss on claim preclusion doctrine adopted by many
American courts (regarding the claim preclusive effect of class actions
that are litigated to judgment, rather than settled).*98
Like Switzerland and Germany, Swedish preclusion doctrine
focuses on the remedy sought. A Swedish judgment precludes relitigation of "all circumstances which can be alleged as support for the
same remedies regardless of whether they are alleged."9 9 Thus, a suit
seeking to invalidate a will because only one witness was present would
preclude a second suit seeking to invalidate the will because the testator was mentally ill. Since both actions seek the same remedy-invalidation of the will-the judgment in the first suit would preclude the
second action. 100
France and Romania not only require an identity of the relief
claimed, but also "an identity of the legal cause of action." 10 1 For
example, where a plaintiff filed one claim for restitution of land and a
second claim based on a contractual provision, the Romanian Court
of Appeal held that claim preclusion did not apply because the claims
did not have "the same legal basis. ' 10 2 France, too, traditionally
accorded ajudgment claim preclusive effect only if the second action
involved the "same legal grounds" as the first.10 3 Thus, under the
98
99

See supra Part I.A.
LARS HEUMAN ET AL., BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, THE EFFECT IN THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS: RECOGNI-

18-19 (2008)
file with author) (emphasis added).

TION, RESJuDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS: SWEDEN
OF SWEDEN] (on

100
101

[hereinafter REPORT

See id.
BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 16; see also EMMANUELJEULAND,

BRITISH INST.

OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, THE EFFECT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATrER: RECOGNITION, RESJUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS:

FRANCE 22 (2008) [hereinafter REPORT OF FRANCE] (on file with author) ("It is neces-

sary that the thing claimed be the same [and] that the claim be based on the same
grounds. .. " (quoting CODE CIVIL [C. cIV.] art. 1351 (Fr.))); NOREL ROSNER, BRITISH
INST. OF INT'L & COMP. L., THE EFFEcr IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OFJUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTER: RECOGNITION, RESJuDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS:
ROMANIA 14 (2008) [hereinafter REPORT OF ROMANIA] (on file with author) ("[lI]t

must be shown that litigation has the same object (the court looks to the substance

and not the form of the action), is based on the same cause of action, that is the same
legal basis . .. ").

102 REPORT OF ROMANIA, supra note 101, at 14 & n.43 (citing CA Iasi [Court of
Appeal Iasi] 11960/1999 JURISPRUDENTA PE ANUL 187 (Rom.)).
103 See REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 22 (describing the "triple identity
test" codified in C. CiV. art. 1351 (Fr.), available in English at http://195.83.177.9/
code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=22&r=-486#art4419 (search "keyword" for "triple identity
test"; then follow search result "art. 1351" hyperlink)). The triple identity test, which
requires the same parties, the same relief, and the same legal grounds, "has, of late,
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traditional French view, "if a first judgment denied damages for personal fault... ,it was possible to bring a new claim on the ground of
product liability.

'1 0 4

This approach affords a losing plaintiff the

opportunity to pursue a different theory of recovery in a second
action for what would be considered the same claim under a transactional approach.
Recent decisions by the French Court of Cassation suggest that
French claim preclusion doctrine may now define the scope of the
claim more broadly, requiring the plaintiff to present all grounds for
relief in the first court or lose the opportunity to pursue them in subsequent litigation. 0 5 This recent line of cases brings French preclu10 6
sion law closer in line with German law.
To the extent that some of the participating European countries
define the scope of the claim more narrowly than American courts do
or accord judgments less robust claim preclusive effect than American
courts do, they appear to support defendants' arguments against certification of transnational class actions. But, given the class action gloss,
which limits the claim preclusive effect of class action judgments in
American courts, and the small number of American class actions that
actually are litigated to judgment, the force of these arguments should
not be overstated. Moreover, the willingness of some foreign courts to
accord judgments "wider preclusive effects" renders the differences
between American and European claim preclusion doctrine even less
significant.
2.

Wider Preclusive Effects

Even if a country's law defines the scope of the claim narrowly
and therefore limits ajudgment's claim preclusive effects, it nevertheless may prevent parties from raising claims or defenses in a second
action that "should" have been raised in the first action by according
the judgment "wider preclusive effects."' 0 7 For example, England and
not been strictly adhered to, and instead, there is a growing trend which focuses on
the general concept of the first set of proceedings as a whole." Id.
104 Id. at 24.
105 See id. at 22-25 (citing Cass. ass. pl~n., July 7, 2006, D. 2006, 2135 note Weiller
(Fr.); Cass. com., Feb. 20, 2007, Procddures 2007, 128, note Perrot (Fr.); Cass. 3e civ.,
Feb. 13, 2008, JCP 2008 IV 142 (Fr.)).
106 See id. at 25.
107 BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 34-35. The Questionnaire defines wider
preclusive effects ofjudgments as any preclusive effects that cannot be characterized
as claim preclusive or issue preclusive effects. QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 76, at 8. It
bars the raising of related claims or the relitigation of issues "on the basis of procedural fairness or abuse of process." Id.
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Wales, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain employ the doctrine of
abuse of process, which "considers it an abuse for a party to raise a
10 8
claim or defence that should have been raised in the first action."
Where an abuse is alleged, the court may preclude relitigation of the
10 9
claim or issue that should have been raised in the first action.
Thus, the doctrine of "wider preclusive effects" supplements the claim
preclusive effect of a judgment.
In at least one case, Ashmore v. British Coal Corp., 110 the English
Court of Appeal extended wider preclusive effects to nonparties.
There, over a thousand female canteen workers contended that they
had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and filed claims
with the Industrial Tribunal. The tribunal ordered the trial of twelve
sample cases and stayed the remaining claims. The chair of the tribunal explicitly stated that "[t] hese would not be test cases, the decision
on any of the cases would not be binding upon the applicants ...

any other cases.""'
1
cases lost.

in

Following a hearing, the plaintiffs in the sample

12

Later, another of the claimants sought to have the stay lifted so
she could present her claim.11 3 The Industrial Tribunal struck her
14
claim on the ground that it was "vexatious" and an abuse of process.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that she had
an "absolute right" to present her claim unless she was bound by claim
or issue preclusion or unless she agreed to be bound by the findings
in the sample case. Instead, it accepted the defendant's argument
that
where sample cases have been chosen so that the tribunal can inves-

tigate all the relevant evidence as fully as possible, and findings have
been made on that evidence, it is contrary to the interests ofjustice
and public policy to allow those same issues to be litigated again,
115
unless there is fresh evidence which justifies re-opening the issue.
108 BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 34.
109 See id.; see also REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 41 (citing
Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co., [2002] 2 A.C. I (Eng.); Henderson v. Henderson,
(1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 313 (Ch.); 3 Hare 100 (Eng.)); REPORT Or SPAIN, supra note 91,
at 60 ("[W]here a claim may be based on different facts or legal arguments all of
which are know [sic] of at the time the claim is brought, then all must be argued at
that time, since the Claimant will not be entitled to reserve arguments and then raise
them in later proceedings.").
110 [1990] 2 Q.B. 338 (C.A.) (Eng.).
111 Id. at 346 (quoting the Chair's decision).
112 Id. at 346-47.
113 Id. at 347.
114

Id.

115

Id. at 348-49.
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If this particular claimant remained free to pursue her individual
claim, the court reasoned, then so did the hundreds of other claimants; but individual trials of their claims would have frustrated the
point of the sample cases. 116 To the extent that the English Court of
Appeal bound nonparties who were not formally represented in the
sample cases by the judgment(s) rendered therein, it applied the doctrine of wider preclusive effects to bind a broader set of absentees than
would be subject to claim preclusion under American law. 117 More
generally, the doctrine of wider preclusive effects appears malleable
enough to permit courts in the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain, as
well as England, to bar the relitigation of claims that are sufficiently
closely related to the claims pursued in the F1 court that the F2 court
concludes they "should have been brought" in Fl. Thus, the "wider
preclusive effects" that judgments have in at least some of the participating European countries may approximate the claim preclusive
effect of American judgments and undercut defendants' arguments
against certification of transnational class actions in American courts.
3.

Settlements as Judgments

Given the significant role that court-approved settlements play in
the resolution of class actions filed in American courts and in the pre18
clusion of subsequent litigation on the settled (and related) claims,
it is interesting to note that not all of the participating European
countries accord preclusive effect to settlements and consent judg1 19 Sweden, 120 and Switzerland 121
ments. While England and Wales,
116 Id. at 349. The court conceded that if there were fresh evidence that "'should
entirely change the aspect of the case,'" then the court should hear the claim that
otherwise would have been an abuse of process. Id. at 354 (citing Mcllkenny v. Chief
Constable of W. Midlands, [1980] Q.B. 283 at 334 (Eng.); Phosphate Sewage Co. v.
Molleson, (1879) 4 App. Cas. 801 (H.L.) at 814 (Eng.)).
117 Cf Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884-85 (2008) (disapproving of the doctrine of virtual representation); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989) ("[A] party
seeking ajudgment binding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene; he
must be joined." (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110
(1969))).
118 See supra Part I.B.
119 See REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 16-18 (noting that an
.agreement of the parties without any determination by a court" is not ajudicial decision entitled to preclusive effects, but adding that "the position will be different if the
court... has formally dismissed a claim following its withdrawal" (citing, inter alia, In
re S. Am. & Mex. Co., [1895] 1 Ch. 37 (CA) at 45 (Eng.) ("[A] judgment by consent
or by default raises an estoppel just in the same way as ajudgment after the Court has
exercised a judicial discretion in the matter."); The Kronprinz, [1887] 12 A.C. 256
(H.L.) (Eng.))); see also PETER B. BARNETT, RESJUDCATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN
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all treat judicially approved settlements as judgments capable of having preclusive effects, many of the other participating countries do
122
not. For example, in Germany there are no consent judgments,
and "[s] ettlements, whether made of record or not, have no res judicata effect."123 In the Netherlands, court-approved settlements and
other judgments rendered in noncontentious proceedings lack
preclusive effect, although they are contractually binding.1 24 In
Spain, too, when the court approves a settlement, making no independent ruling on the merits, its order has no substantive preclusive
effects. 125 Similarly, the Report of France notes that a judicial contract (contratjudiciaire)is "an enforceable act of the judge which takes
into account an agreement between parties. But it has the nature of a
contract and may not be reviewed as a judgment."126 The French
report goes on to suggest that judicially approved settlements also lack
1.26, at 14 (2001) ("Ajudgment or order by consent, although based
foremost on the parties' agreement or settlement, is capable of operating as a res
judicataonce the judicial tribunal gives judicial sanction and coercive authority to the
consent agreement or settlement.").
120 See REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra note 99, at 11 ("[T]he court may confirm the
settlement in ajudgment where requested by both parties. Such a judgment has legal
force and may be enforced to the extent that it imposes obligations on the parties."

JUDGMENTS

(footnote omitted) (citing

RATTEGANESBALKEN

[RB] [Code of Civil Procedure] 17:6

(Swed.))).
121

See

REPORT OF SWITZERLAND,

supra note 93, at 11 ("Several Cantonal Codes of

Civil Procedure treat judgments that terminate the proceedings based on parties' consent (Sachentscheidsurrogate)as equal to a Sachentscheid [i.e., final determination on the
merits] with regard to preclusive effects."). The Federal Supreme Court has not
definitively resolved whether court-approved settlements have preclusive effect under
federal law. See id.
122 See REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 17 (citing MURRAY & STORNER, supra
note 94, at 356).
123 Id. (citing MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 94, at 356). The Report of Germany
goes on to note that "[slettlements can . . .be raised in later litigation as having
altered the position in substantive law, but this is an effect different to resjudicata."
Id.; accord MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 94, at 356 ("A prior settlement may be
raised as an accord and satisfaction in later litigation. However, it is not considered a
judgment and the rules of res adjudicatado not apply.").

124

See REPORT

OF THE NETHERLANDS,

supra note 87, at 31-32, 48; see also id. at 55

(noting that court-approved settlements are contractually binding).

125

See REPORT

OF SPAIN,

supra note 91, at 40 ("[I]n cases of a settlement between

the parties (transacci6n), the court issues an order (Auto) recording it. These judicial
decisions do not have substantive resiudicata effects, preventing later proceedings.
Therefore, in fresh proceedings, the allegation of the existence of the settlement will
not put an end to the proceedings. Nevertheless, the court will issue the new decision
taking into account the content of the aforementioned settlement." (footnote
omitted)).

126

REPORT OF FRANCE,

supra note 101, at 20.
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res judicata effect, although it appears that the law in this area is less
127
than clear.
The hesitancy of European courts to grant preclusive effect to
settlements is reflected in both the Brussels/Lugano Regime and in
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The provisions of the Brussels/Lugano Regime governing recognition of Member State judgments do not apply to court-approved settlements
because settlements are treated as private contracts rather than judgments even if they are reached in court and bring the legal proceedings to a conclusion.1 28 While settlements do not qualify as judgments
under Article 32 of the Brussels Regulations and, therefore, are not
entitled to recognition (or preclusive effects) under Article 33, they
nevertheless may be enforceable under Article 58, which provides that
court-approved settlements that are enforceable in the rendering state
"shall be enforceable in the State addressed under the same condi129
tions as authentic instruments," such as notarial deeds.
Similarly, while the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides for the enforcement of judicial settlements (transactionsjudiciaires),130it does not accord them preclusive effect "mainly

because the effects of settlements are so different in different legal
systems." 131 The Explanatory Report to the Hague Convention
127

See id.

128 See ADRIAN BRIGGS & PETER REES, CILJURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 521 (4th
ed. 2005); BuRKHARD HESS ET AL., THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION 44/2001, at 160
(2008); BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 43. In order for a decision to qualify as a
"judgment" under Article 32 of the Brussels Regulation, the court of a Member State
must have decided on its own authority the issues between the parties. See BIICL
REPORT, supra note 67, at 42-43 (citing Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren v. Boch,
1994 E.C.R. 1-2237). According to the European Court of Justice, "That condition is
not fulfilled in the case of a settlement, even if it was reached in a court of a Contracting State and brings legal proceedings to an end. Settlements in court are essen18.
tially contractual . . . ." Solo Kleinmotoren, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2237,
129 See BRIGGS & REES, supra note 128, at 521; EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw: BRUSSELS I REGULATION 692 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2007); HESS ET AL., supra note 128, at 159; PETER STONE, CIVIL
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE

154-55 (1998). Article 57 in turn provides

that "[a] document which has been formally drawn up or registered as an authentic
instrument and is enforceable in one [Member] State shall, in another [Member]
State, be declared enforceable." Brussels Regulation, supranote 69, art. 57. The Heidelberg Report on the Brussels Regulation notes the sparsity of case law in relation to
settlements. See HESS ET AL., supra note 128, at 160.
130 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 12, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M.
1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt37en.pdf. "
131 TREVOR HARTLEY & MASATO DOGAUCHI, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTER209, at 61 (2005), available at http://www.
NATIONAL LAW, EXPLANATORY REPORT
hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf.
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explains the consequence of enforcing settlements while simultaneously denying them recognition and preclusive effect:
Assume that A and B conclude a contract with an exclusive choice
of court clause in favour of the courts of State X. Subsequently, A
sues B before a court in that State for 1000 euros, a sum which he
claims is due under the contract. The parties then enter into ajudicial settlement under which B agrees to pay A 800 euros, State X
being a State where this may be done.
If B fails to pay, A may bring proceedings to enforce the settlement in State Y, another Contracting State. Such proceedings will
be covered by Article 12 of the Convention. Assume, however, that
B pays the money in compliance with the settlement without any
need for enforcement proceedings. If A nevertheless brings a new
action for the remaining 200 euros before the courts of State Y, B
cannot ask the court to recognise the settlement under the Convention as a
proceduraldefence to the claim (which would make the claim inadmissible in

some legal systems). The Convention does not provide for this, mainly
because the effects of settlements are so different in different legal
132
systems.
If settlements in some or many European countries are enforceable as contracts but do not preclude subsequent litigation between the
parties, then it is possible that foreign defendants who settle class
actions filed against them in the United States may not receive in
Europe the protection from relitigation that they would receive at
home. This is a significant issue that merits additional research.
4.

Issue Preclusion

In about half of the countries surveyed-England and Wales, the
Netherlands, Spain, and the United States-judgments have issue
preclusive effect. 133 In the other countries, however-Germany,
France, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland-judgments have no issue
132

Id. 1 207-208, at 59-60 (emphasis added).

133 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 27 n.149. In fact, in England and Wales,
nonparties who had a right to intervene in proceedings that effectively would have
determined their fights and obligations but chose not to intervene are bound by the
judgment. See REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 34 (citing House of
Spring Gardens Ltd. v. Waite, [1991] 1 Q.B. 241 at 252-53 (Eng.)); BIICL REPORT,
supra note 67, at 33 n.196 (citing Wytcherley v. Andrews, [1871] 2 L.R.P. & D. 327 at
328 (Eng.)); cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989) ("Joinder as a party, rather
than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which
potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree.").

2011]

INTERJURISDICTIONAL

PRECLUSION

preclusive effect.1 34 When coupled with the narrow definition of the
claim for purposes of claim preclusion employed in these countries
and the failure to accord settlements claim preclusive effect, this lack
of issue preclusive effect may leave parties with a fair bit of room to
relitigate matters already adjudicated by changing the theory upon
which they sue or by seeking different relief.
5.

Parties Bound

While differences regarding claim preclusion, wider preclusive
effects, the binding effects of settlements, and issue preclusion are all
quite salient, what may be most relevant here is the willingness (or
not) of the participating European countries to bind persons who
were not formally named as parties to the prior litigation. The participating European countries uniformly limit the claim preclusive effect
of ajudgment to the parties to the proceedings, 13 5 but not all of them
define the "parties to the proceedings" identically.' 3 6 All of the participating European countries bind persons named as parties to the first
action 137 and their legal successors. 138

Some countries also bind

absentees if their interests were represented in the action.1 39 The
BIICL Report notes that "[t] his may occur in the context of group
and representative actions." 140 We turn, then, to the circumstances in
134 See REPORT OF GERMW'J, supra note 93, at 37 ("The only part of the judgment
that is binding is the decision of the court on the procedural claim which is limited to
the 'Streitgegenstand' [i.e., the demand] . . . e.g. payment of 10.000 Euro damages
for breach of contract ....
A judgment does not bind later courts on preliminary
questions such as the existence of the contract, the breach of its conditions, etc.");
BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 27 & n.148 (identifying limited circumstances in
which judgments in Romania and Switzerland have limited issue preclusive effect).
135 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 16 n.46 (listing all countries surveyed
except France); id. at 19 (stating that claim preclusion "principally only applies
between the named parties in proceedings"). The Report of France makes clear that
under French law, too, generally only the parties to the first lawsuit are bound by the

judgment. See

REPORT OF FRANCE,

supra note 101, at 22-23. Indeed, the Report of

France further notes that " [r]esjudicata relates only to the parties. This aspect is one
of the main theoretical obstacles of the implementation of class action with the opting
out system in France." Id. at 5.
136 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 16-17.
137 See id. at 17.
138 See id. at 24. The BIICL Report and the country reports consider in detail the
extent to which others-such as intervenors, impleaded third parties, and priviesmay be bound by a judgment. See id. at 19-27. We will focus on the extent to which
represented parties, such as absent class members, are bound.
139 See id. at 17.
140 Id. (listing England and Wales and the Netherlands); see also REPORT OF
ENGLAND AND WALES, supranote 87, at 29-30 (identifying five circumstances in which
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which, as a matter of domestic law, the participating European countries authorize group litigation to resolve disputes affecting large numbers of people and the extent to which the judgments rendered in
such litigation are accorded preclusive effects within the rendering
state. Once we understand the extent to which the participating
European countries accord their own group litigation judgments
preclusive effect, we can explore the extent to which they may accord
preclusive effect to the group litigation judgments of other countries.
C.

The Preclusive Effects of Group LitigationJudgments Under the
National Laws of the ParticipatingEuropean Countries

There has been a dramatic change in the legal landscape in
Europe as the participating European countries (and others) have
experimented with a variety of vehicles for efficiently and fairly resolving disputes that affect large numbers of people.1 4 ' Indeed, as Professors Issacharoff and Miller contend, "[a]nalyzing European class
actions is like shooting at a moving target."1 42 The country reports
prepared in connection with the BIICLJudgments Project reveal both
an increasing willingness on the part of the participating European
the Civil Procedure Rules permit a nonparty whose interests are represented to be
bound by a judgment, and further discussing the binding effect of group litigation);
REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 54-55 (discussing collective actions
and collective settlements and their respective preclusive effects); infra notes 208-17
and accompanying text.
141 In addition to the countries surveyed here, a number of European countries
have recently enacted class action litigation, including Denmark, Gruppesogsmil
[Class Actions] (2007:181); see also LAW DEP'T, DANISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, NEW
RULES ON DANISH CLASS ACTIONS (2007), available at http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/
fileadmin/downloads/rules.pdf (describing the effect of Act Number 181); Norway,
35 ch. Lov om mekling og rettergang i sivile tvister (Tvisteloven) [Law on Mediation
and Legal Proceedings in Civil Disputes (The Dispute Act)] (2007:90) 5, available in
English at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/globalclassaction/PDF/Norway-Legislation.pdf; Finland, Ryhmakannelaki [Class Action Law] (2007:444), available in
English at http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2007/en20070444.pdf; and Italy,
Decreto Legislativo 6 settembre 2005, n. 206, in G.U. 8 ottobre 2005, n. 235, available
in English at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/globalclassaction/PDF/ItalianCollectiveAction forDamages.pdf. For a discussion of various approaches to collective
and representative actions, see OSCAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARAIVE CONTEXT 390-462 (2007).
142 Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 45, at 191-92. Professors Issacharoff and
Miller question whether the European reforms will be effective as long as the Europeans continue to resist American-style entrepreneurial lawyering. See id. at 180--81; cf.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L.
REv. 288, 346-49 (2010) (proposing a nonentrepreneurial model that employs a nonprofit organization as plaintiff and an opt-in class).
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countries to experiment with group litigation 143 and a cautious attitude regarding the preclusion of claims held by represented nonparties. As the late Professor Nagareda pointed out, while Europe has
embraced aggregate litigation, it "stops markedly short of full-fledged
embrace for U.S.-style class actions." 144 Professor Coffee identifies two
reasons for Europe's reluctance to fully embrace American-style optout class actions: first, Europeans fear that opt-out class actions will
"invite [ ] abuse by giving a positive settlement value to nonmeritorious actions," and second, Europeans believe that "a litigant should not
be bound by agents that the litigant has not authorized to act on the
litigant's behalf."1 45 Thus, the participating European countries have
sought to develop group litigation vehicles that achieve efficiency
without sacrificing fairness to either defendants or individual
claimants.
Any effort to categorize the different types of group litigation that
the Europeans have developed is fraught with difficulty. Christopher
Hodges posits that there are two primary models: a representative
model, in which one litigant files suit purporting to represent a group
of others; and an aggregation model, in which the court collectively
resolves a group of individually filed claims. 146 Let us analyze the
results of the BICLJudgments Project with these two models in mind,
seeking to understand both the circumstances in which the participating European countries authorize group litigation and the extent to
143 Of the eight participating European countries, only Romania appears to have
no group litigation mechanism in place. See REPORT OF RoMANIA, supra note 101, at
18; BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 22. In discussing the group litigation options
pursued by the participating European countries, I draw not only on the BIICL
Report and the national reports prepared in connection with the BIICL Judgments
Project, but also on the country reports prepared in connection with Stanford Law
School's Global Class Actions Exchange and other supplemental sources. See Global
Class Actions Exchange, STAN. L. SCH., http://www.stanford.edu/group/lawlibrary/cgibin/globalclassactions (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
144 Nagareda, supra note 3, at 6.
145 Coffee, supra note 142, at 330.
146 See CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS
IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 2 (2008); see also BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 22-23
(discussing comparative response and actions in different legal systems and the claim
preclusive effects of judgments on group members); cf. Coffee, supra note 142, at
298-304 (offering five models of large-scale aggregate litigation: the opt-out class
action, the non-opt-out class action, the opt-in class action, representative actions,
and public interest litigation); Louis Degos & Geoffrey V. Morson, Class System: The
Reforms of Class Action Laws in Europe Are as Varied as the Nations Themselves, L.A. LAw.,
Nov. 2006, at 32, 34 (using "the term 'class action' to refer to any European procedure in which one or more plaintiffs seek a civil legal remedy in a national court or a
procedure in which any such remedy may be sought on their behalf").
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which they accord preclusive effect to the judgments rendered
therein.
1. Representative Actions
Many of the jurisdictions surveyed in the BIICL Judgments Project permit some type of representative action. Unlike the aggregation model described in section II.C.2 below, which seeks a collective
resolution of a group of claims filed by individual litigants, a representative action permits one person or entity to file suit and to represent
an individual or group of individuals who do not themselves join the
litigation as parties. 147 Since our ultimate objective is to understand
the extent to which the participating European countries would
accord preclusive effect to decisions rendered in group litigation, we
will focus on those representative actions filed on behalf of a group of
similarly situated persons, and put to the side representative actions
filed on behalf of individual children, those lacking mental capacity,
148
trust beneficiaries, and the like.
a.

Collective Actions

152
15 0
the Netherlands, 151 and Switzerland,
In France, 149 Germany,

representative organizations or interest groups are authorized to
147 See HODGES, supra note 146, at 2; BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 22.
148 See REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 29-33 (describing a variety of circumstances in which a nonparty whose interests are represented by another
may be bound by the judgment); REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 27-29
(describing the binding effect of litigation brought on behalf of minors and others
lacking capacity, and others in privity with a named party, such as a corporate chairman); REPORT OF SWrrZERLAND, supra note 93, at 25-27 (describing the binding effect
on a child of ajudgment obtained by a custodial parent seeking child support); BIICL
REPORT, supra note 67, at 22-23; REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at
43-45 (describing the preclusive effect a judgment has on minors and majority

shareholders).
149 See REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 28 (citingCODE DU TRAVAIL [C.
art. L411-11 (2007) (Fr.); C. civ. art. L421-1 (Fr.)); VtRONIQUE MAGNIER,

TRAV.]
CLASS

ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FoRMS OF COLLECTIVE LITIGATION: PROTOCOL

(2007), available at http://www.law.stanford.
edu/library/globalclassaction/PDF/FranceNational_Report.pdf.
150 See DIETmAR BAETGE, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FORMS OF
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION: GERMANY 1-14, 16-18, 21, 25-27, 30 (2007), available at
FOR NATIONAL REPORTERS: FRANCE 5-7

http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/globalclassaction/reports.html#germany;
REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 32-33 (discussing interest group complaints in
consumer and unfair competition cases).
151 See ANiKA TZANKOVA, THE NETHERLANDS 5 (2007), available at http://www.law.

stanford.edu/iibrary/globalclassaction/PDF/Netherlands-NationalReport_2.pdf;
REPORT OF THE NETHERIANDS, supra note 87, at 54 & nn.548-49 (citing BURGERLUJK
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bring collective actions to enforce specified laws, such as consumer
protection laws and laws against unfair competition. 153 These collective actions may seek injunctive or declaratory relief to protect the
interests of their members, but not monetary relief.1 4 As one commentator put it, "[t]o the extent that the purpose of this type of
actions [sic] is to defend the collective interest, the injury to be
repaired continues to be collective and the repair of an individual
1
injury is not possible, unlike a true class action."

55

WETBOEK[BW] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 3:305a-c & 3:305a(3) (Neth.)); Memorandum from
I.N. Tzankova & D.F. Lunsingh Scheurleer, NautaDutilh, to Deborah Hensler, Professor, Stanford Law Sch., & Christopher Hodges, Head, Research Programme on Civil
Justice Sys., Univ. of Oxford, Re: Class Actions, Group Litigation and Other Forms of
Collective Litigation Dutch Report 2-3, 7 (Sept. 24, 2007) [hereinafter, Tzankova &
Lunsingh Scheurleer], available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/globalclassaction/PDF/Netherlands NationaLReport.pdf. The Dutch law requires that "the
interest of the group members are similar enough (a kind of a commonality test) to
be handled in a collective action." Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra, at 7.

152

See SAMUEL P.

BAUMGARTNER, GROUP LITIGATION IN SWITZERLAND

14-29

(2007),

available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/globalclassaction/PDF/SwitzerlandNationalReport.pdf; REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 93, at 25 (citing
SCHIWEIZERISCHES

ZIVILGESETZBUCH

[ZGB],

CODE CIVIL [CC],

CODICE

CIVLE

[CC]

Dec. 19, 1986, SR 241, art. 10 (Switz.)). In Switzerland, "the common
law Verbandsklage is limited to claims of harm to one's person." Id. at 15. Swiss law
also allows associations to challenge decisions by administrative agencies, id. at 31-34,
and allows a shareholder to sue on behalf of other shareholders, id. at 34-37.
153 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 22-24; Coffee, supra note 142, at 302
(describing the plaintiffs as "ombudsmen, private consumer organizations, or other
[CIVIL CODE]

nonprofit associations"); Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 45, at 192-97 (identifying
and discussing four objectives served by the requirement that the lead plaintiff be an

organization). England and Wales also authorize representative actions to pursue
consumer claims under the Enterprise Act of 2002. See Mark Mildred, Group Actions,
in THE LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 565, 596 (Andrew Grubb & Geraint Howells eds.,
2007) (citing Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 19 (Eng.)). Mildred stated that no claims
had been made under the law as of 2007. Id. Throughout the European Union,
European Union Directive 98/27 authorizes "a qualified entity" to seek injunctive
relief to protect the collective interests of consumers. Council Directive 98/27, art. 3,
1998 O.J. (L 166) 151 (EC), as amended by European Union Directive 2005/25, 2005
O.J. (L 149) 22; accord Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation UnderEU and German
Law, 11 DUKEJ. COMp. & INT'L L. 355, 355-57, 359 (2001); Degos & Morson, supra
note 146, at 32.
154 See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 22; BAUMGARTNER, supra note 152, at 14, 17, 23;
REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 33 ("The interest group complaint seeks in
almost all cases injunctive relief."); MAGNIER, supra note 149, at 9; TZANKOVA, supra
note 151, at 5, 9; REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 54; Koch, supra note
153, at 358-60; Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 151, at 2; cf. BAETGE,
supra note 150, at 23-24 (describing "skimming-off" actions, which seek to recover

illegal profits in antitrust cases).
155 MAGNIER, supra note 149, at 9.
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Some have expressed concern that a suit for money damages
would interfere with the members' individual rights. 156 In these collective actions, only the unions or the plaintiff organizations (and the
defendant) are bound by the judgment; the members remain free to
bring their own individual actions. 15 7 As the Report of the Netherlands emphasizes, "It]he preclusive effect does not extend to those persons whose interests are represented. The class members can still sue
in their own rights, although a certain persuasive effect is typically attributed to those decisions."1 58 Similarly, the Report of Germany states
that "other interest groups or even the members of the relevant interest group or association are not bound by the judgment and could
start separate proceedings" 1 59 if the plaintiff loses the action.
If the plaintiff prevails in a German collective action alleging the
use of unfair standard contract terms, any party to a contract containing the challenged language may invoke the judgment against the
defendant, who is bound by it.160 Thus, Germany appears to sanction
a result rejected by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in 1966-a
form of "'one-way' intervention"-that permits absentees to benefit
from a judgment if the plaintiff is successful but to avoid its binding
effect if the plaintiff loses.16 1 The risk to the defendant in Europe
may not be great, however, for, as the Supreme Court of Switzerland
noted, absentees are not likely to undertake individual actions against
the defendant if the representative association already has lost on the
same claim. 162 The prohibition in Europe on contingent fees and the
prevailing "loser-pays" rule regarding attorneys' fees1 63 make individ156
157

See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 152, at 17.
See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 14; BAUMGARTNER, supra note 152, at 24-25;

REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 33; REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 28;
REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supranote 93, at 25; TZANKOVA, supranote 151, at 6; REPORT

OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 54; Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra

note 151, at 4, 10.
158 REPORT OF THE
159
160

Act,

NETHERLANDS,

supra note 87, at 54.

REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 33.
See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 22 (discussing how the German Injunction Suit

Unterlassungsklagengesetz [UKIaG]

[Injunction Suit Act], Aug. 27, 2002,

BUNDESGESETZBLATr, Teil I [BGBL. I] at S. 977 (Ger.), alters the preclusive effect of
judgments rendered in the consumer law context); REPORT OF GERANv, supra note

93, at 33 (same).
161 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee's note (1966); see also Tzankova
& Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 151, at 10 ("[D]efendants ... can 'only loose' [sic]
in a collective action.").
162 See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 152, at 24-25 (citing BGer May 20, 1947, 73 BGE
II 65, 72-73 (Switz.)).
163 See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 45, at 198, 201.
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ual follow-up suits unlikely, especially in the face of a loss by the organizational plaintiff. 164
b.

Group Actions

In addition to the United States, three other countries participating in the BIICL Judgments Project-Sweden, Spain, and Francepermit group actions that seek monetary relief 16 5 and another participating country-the Netherlands-permits class-wide settlements of
mass claims. Unlike the collective actions discussed above, these
group actions and group settlements seek monetary relief like American class actions. The group action vehicles discussed here nevertheless differ from American class actions in important ways. As we will
see, the Swedish and French group actions require absent group
164 American courts have also noted that "defendants' res judicata concerns are
'more hypothetical than real,' since the likelihood of relitigation by absent class members in a European forum is low," given a "loser pays" system of attorneys' fees, the
absence of contingency fee arrangements, and the knowledge that one court has
already rejected the claim. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76,
106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also, e.g., Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113, 135
n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (identifying "such practical deterrents [to subsequent litigation
in Europe] as the unavailability of contingent-fee representation or a class action
vehicle in those courts").
165 England and Wales also permit representative actions "[w]here more than one
person has the same interest in a claim." CPR 19.6(1) (Eng.); accord REPORT OF
ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 29; CHRISTOPHER HODGES, GLOBAL CLASS
ACTIONS PROJECT: COUNTRY REPORT: ENGLAND AND WALES 3 (2007) [hereinafter
HODGES, ENGLAND AND WALES], available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/
globalclassaction/PDF/EnglandCountryReport.pdf; CHRISTOPHER HODGES, MULTIPARTY ACTIONS 122-24 (2001) [hereinafter HODGES, MULTI-Party Actions]; RACHAEL
MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS 87-89 (2004); Neil

Andrews, Multi-Party Proceedingsin England: Representative and Group Actions, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 249, 250-57 (2001); Mildred, supra note 153, at 592-99. Because
the courts have interpreted the phrase "same interest" very restrictively, this mechanism has been very rarely used. See HODGES, supra note 146, at 3; HODGES, MULTIParty Actions, supra, at 122-24; MULHERON, supra, at 80-84, 87; Mildred, supra note
153, at 594. An influential research report prepared by Professor Rachael Mulheron

for the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales concluded in 2008 that "there is
overwhelming evidence of the need for a further collective redress mechanism,"
including an opt-out mechanism. Rachael Mulheron, Reform of Collective Redress in

England and Wales, at vii (Civil Justice Council of Eng. & Wales, Research Paper,
2008), available at http://www.civiijusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/collective-redress.pdf;
see also Mulheron, supra note 5, at 413 ("[I]nsofar as England and Wales are concerned, there is an overwhelming evidence of need for an opt-out collective redress
mechanism . ..

."

(footnote omitted)).
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members to opt in, 166 the Spanish and French group actions are limited to consumer claims, 167 and the Dutch legislation authorizes only
168
court-approved settlements, not representative litigation.
The Swedish Group Proceedings Act, which took effect in 2003,
authorizes a plaintiff to file a group action on behalf of others whose
claims are "founded on circumstances that are common or of a similar
nature."1 69 According to Professor Per Henrik Lindblom, "[t]he
Group Proceedings Act brought a paradigm shift with respect to
group actions"' 70 in that it authorizes "[a] 'true' class action, brought
in a general court by a member of the group and allowing claims for
not only injunctive relief but also individual damages for the group
members." 71 Previously, only certain entities had authority to bring
group claims only in courts of limited jurisdiction,1 72 and they could
1 73
not seek money damages for absent class members.
Under the Group Proceedings Act, group actions may be filed by
one or more members of the group, certain nonprofit organizations
or government authorities. 1 74 Unlike the Spanish law to be discussed
below, which authorizes only consumer class actions, the Swedish
Group Proceedings Act "is applicable in all cases normally brought in
general courts of first instance," I 75 regardless of the substantive claim.
166

Issacharoff and Miller identify three problems posed by opt4n procedures:

'problems with incentivizing a named plaintiff under an opt-in regime, difficulties in
attracting adequate participation rates, and the challenge of offering defendants the
opportunity to achieve global peace through the class procedure." Issacharoff &
Miller, supra note 45, at 202.
167 See Report of France, supra note 101, at 27-28; REPORT
at 47-50.

OF SPAIN,

supranote 91,

OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 55.
LAG OM GRUPPRATTEGANG [GROUP PROCEEDINGS ACT] (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS] 2002:599) (Swed.), available in English at http://www.sweden.gov.se/
content/1/c6/02/77/67/bcbelf4f.pdf; accord REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra note 99, at

168

See REPORT

169 See

32-33;

PER HENRIK LINDBLOM, NATIONAL REPORT: GROUP LITIGATION IN SWEDEN

8-28

(2007), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/globalclassaction/PDF/SwedenNationalReport.pdf. Enacted in 2002, the Group Proceedings Act entered into

force on January 1, 2003. During its first five years, only nine group actions were filed
and only one was resolved, but the availability of the group action vehicle apparently
has prompted the prefiling settlement of other group claims. See id. at 21-26, 35
(discussing the cases).
170 LINDBLOM, supra note 169, at 3.
171 Id. at 6.
172 See id.
173 See id. at 5-6, 29.

174
BLOM,

See 4-6 §§ LAG

OM GRUPPRATrEGANG

action: private, organization, and public").
175

(SFS 2002:599) (Swed.); see also

LIND-

supa note 169, at 11-12 (stating that the Act applies to "three forms of group
LINDBLOM,

supra note 169, at 10.
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After group members receive notice of the action, they must notify
the court in writing if they "wish[ ] to be included in the group
action"; 176 if they do not provide such notice within a specified period

77
of time, they "shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the group."
A Swedish group action judgment is binding only on those group
members who provide notice of their wish to be included (i.e., opt-in)
and whose names are mentioned in thejudgment. I 78 Thus, the opt-in
requirement assuages the concerns of the law's opponents that it
would be unconstitutional to bind absentees by a group action judgment. 179 As the Report of Sweden emphasized, "the judgment does
not have legal force vis-d-vis parties who did not submit an application
notwithstanding that they have claims which could have been

included in the class action." 8 0° Regarding absentees who do opt in,

the group action judgment has the same "legal force" or claim preclusive effect in Sweden as a judgment rendered in an individual
action.' 81 If the group action settles, absent group members are
l8 2
bound only if the court approves the settlement.
In defending the Swedish Group Proceedings Act, Professor
Lindblom specifically emphasized the protection it affords defendants: "[G]roup actions also make defendants more secure, since the
judgment is binding on every member of the group. Group actions
reduce the risk of repeated litigation and strengthens [sic] protection
against frivolous and unethical lawsuits. 'u1s 3 But the opt-in mechanism

does not provide the defendant with global peace. Those prospective
176 14 § LAG OM GRUPPRATrEGANG (SFS 2002:599) (Swed.).
177 Id.; see also LINDBLOM, supra note 169, at 12-13 (describing the Swedish opt-in
system). Professor Lindblom suggests that "rules on the opt-in system for group
members should be supplemented with an opt-out alternative in actions involving
minor claims, at least in public group actions." Id. at 37.

See REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra note 99, at 33; see also 28 § LAG OM GRUPPRATrE(SFS 2002:599) (Swed.) (requiring the court to "specify in ajudgment the members of the group to which the judgment refers"); id. § 29 ("The determination of the
court in group proceedings has legal force in relation to all members of the group
who are subject to the determination."); Choi & Silberman, supra note 3, at 487-88
(contrasting the Swedish procedure with other systems).
179 See LINDBLOM, supra note 169, at 33.
180 REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra note 99, at 33; accord LINDBLOM, supa note 169, at
13.
181 REPORT OF SWEDEN, supa note 99, at 33; see also 29 § LAG OM GRUPPRATrEGANG
(SFS 2002:599) (Swed.) ("The determination of the court in group proceedings has
legal force in relation to all members of the group who are subject to the determination."); LINDBLOM, supra note 169, at 13 ("The ruling takes legal force (resjudicata)
both for and against all who have opted in as if they had personally sued.").
182 See LINDBLOM, supra note 169, at 13-14.
183 Id. at 36.
178

GANG
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plaintiffs who decline to opt in may pursue individual lawsuits against
84
the defendant.
In October 2008, Sweden issued a report evaluating whether the
objectives of the Group Proceedings Act-"strengthening individuals'
actual access to the judicial system"-had been achieved. 185 Notwithstanding suggestions by commentators that the law be amended to
provide an opt-out alternative, 18 6 the report recommended no amendment to the current requirement that "a person must give notice in
order to become a member of the group." 18 7 In other words, it rec88
ommended preservation of the opt-in requirement.
Spanish law, too, authorizes group actions, but only on behalf of
groups of consumers. 18 9 Article 11 of the Civil Procedure Act
(CPA) 190 provides that "legally constituted associations of consumers
and users shall have standing to defend in legal proceedings the rights
and interests of their members and those of the association, and the
general interests of consumers and users."1 9 1 Stated differently, an
association has standing to represent its members, to represent itself,
and to represent "the general interests of consumers and users"
(including, presumably, nonmembers).192
The law distinguishes between situations involving "a group of
consumers or users the members of which are perfectly determined or
easily determinable" 19 3 and those involving "a number of consumers
184

See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 45, at 206-07 (identifying "insufficient

finality" as a problem with opt-in regimes).
185

SWED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF THE GROUP PROCEEDINGS ACT: Sum-

mary 1 (2008), available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/11/43/57/
4562d098.pdf. The full report (in Swedish), Utvdrdering av lagen om grupprdttegfing,is

available at http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/11/35/22/Oaa9952.pdf.

186 See, e.g.,

LINDBLOM,

supra note 169, at 37.

187 SWED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 185, at 3.
188 Accord Werner Kraneburg, Sweden Evaluates Group ProceedingsAct, WITH VIGOUR
& ZEAL (Dec. 19, 2008, 8:26 PM), http://kranenburgesq.com/blog/2008/12/sweden -evaluates -group -proceedings -act (stating that the committee proposes to
"preserv[e] the opt-in model, despite calls for changing to an opt-out model").
189 See REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 47-50; see also PABLO GUTIPRREZ DE
CABIEDES HIDALGO, GROUP LITIGATION IN SPAIN (2007), available at http://www.law.

stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events-media/spain-nationalreport.pdf
(describing the Spanish statutory rules for group litigation).
190 Civil Procedure Act art. 11 (B.O.E. 2000, 575) (Spain), translated in REPORT
SPAIN,

supra note 91, at 48; see GUTIPRREZ

DE CABIEDES HIDALGO,

191 Civil Procedure Act art. 11, para. 1 (Spain); see also GUTIgRREZ
supra note 186, at 9-12 (outlining the CPA).
192 Civil Procedure Act art. 11, para. 2 (Spain).
193 Id.

HIDALGO,

OF

supranote 189, at 2.
DE CABIEDES
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or users who are undetermined or difficult to determine.'

94

Where

the members of the group harmed "are perfectly determined or easily
determinable"-where the class is readily identifiable-an action may
be filed by "[1] associations of consumers and users, [2] legally constituted entities the object of which is the defence or protection of consumers, and [3] groups of the affected persons." 195 These suits do not
pursue the public interest or the political interest of a segment of society (such as environmentalists), but rather the interests of identifiable
people whose claims are pursued collectively for purposes of "procedural economy."196

If an association files suit, the courts require that at least one
affected person belong to the plaintiff association. 197 The "legally
constituted entities" are groups of injured persons formed specifically
to take action on behalf of those injured.' 98 A group of affected persons that do not form such a legally constituted entity may seek to
represent others only where "active voluntary joint litigation" would
not be practicable. 199
On the other hand, where the consumers harmed "are undetermined or difficult to determine"-in cases involving "diffuse interests"-the suit is brought in the public interest and only those
200
associations deemed to be "representative" have standing.
Although the CPA does not define the term "representative," according to the Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, 16 November, associations
are deemed "representative" as long as "they are on the Council of
Consumers and Users, unless the geographical area of the conflict
affects basically one autonomous region, in which case its specific reg20 1
ulations will apply."
194
195

Id. art. 11, para. 3.
Id. art. 11, para. 2; see also GUTItRREZ

DE CABIEDES HIDALGO,

supra note 139, at

9-10 (outlining the CPA).
196 Koch, supra note 153, at 361 (discussing association claims in general, not specifically under Spanish law).

197
198
199

See REPORT
Id.
Id.

OF SPAIN,

supra note 91, at 49.

200 Civil Procedure Act art. 11, para. 3 (Spain); see also GUTIRREZ

DE CABIEDES

supra note 189, at 10 & n.7 (discussing the definition of "representative");
Koch, supra note 153, at 361 (discussing associations' right to sue, but not under
Spanish law in particular).
201 REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 49 (discussing Royal Legislative Decree
(B.O.E. 2007, 49181) (Spain)); cf. id. (explaining that courts gauge the representativeness of an association by the number of its members who reside in the area in
HIDALGO,

which the suit is filed).
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In all events, the CPA provides that absentees are bound by the
judgment, whether they participated or not and whether the class prevailed or not;20 2 the Spanish law rejects an approach that would have
bound consumers and users only if the class prevailed.2 03 Some have
argued that absentees in the Spanish system are more tightly bound
than in an opt-out class action: "'if affected parties who meet the conditions laid down in the judgment do not wish to benefit from it, they
are not actually entitled to take separate action on their own.'"204
The French group action, known as a joint representative action,
combines features of the Swedish and Spanish group actions. Like
the Spanish model, the French joint representative action is limited to
consumer claims and permits a consumer association to pursue the
20 5
individual interests of its members by filing suit on their behalf.

Like the Swedish model, each of the represented consumers must
consent in writing to the action before the trial. 20 6 In these joint representative actions, the consumers who give the written mandates are
20 7
bound by the judgment, but the association itself is not.

The Dutch collective settlement procedure, initially created by
the Dutch Class Action (Financial Settlement) Act (WCAM) to resolve
the claims of women and girls harmed by DES, is different from the
group actions in that it is available only where the parties first reach
an agreement and then jointly request judicial approval thereof; it
202 See id. at 49 (discussing Civil Procedure Act art. 222, para. 3, which states that
"resjudicata affects those who did not take part in the proceeding but who hold rights
referred to in Article 11"); see also GUTI9RREZ DE CABIEDES HIDALGO, supranote 189, at
8-9 (discussing the effects of judgments).
203 See REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 49 (explaining Article 1l's preclusive
effect).
204 Mulheron, supranote 5, at 423 (quoting PAUL LoM-As & MIRA RAJA, FRESHFIELDS
BRUCKHAus DERINGER, CLAss ACTIONS AND THiRD PARIY FUNDING OF LITIGATION 50

(2007), available at http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2007/jun18/188

25.pdf).
205 See REPORT

OF FRANCE,

supra note 101, at 27-28 (citing CODE

DE LA CONSOMMA-

[C. CON.] art. L. 422-1 (Fr.), available in English at http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/
code_29.pdf); see also MAGNIER, supra note 149, at 5, 8-12 (differentiating between
association suits filed in the collective interest of consumers and joint representative
actions that pursue the personal claims of consumers). A similar joint representative
action may be brought on behalf of investors who suffer harm from a common origin.
See id. at 8-9 (citing CODE MONtTAIRE ET FINANCIER [C. MON. ET. FIN.] art. L. 452-2
(Fr.), available in English at http://195.83.177.9/upl/pdf/code-25.pdf). An association cannot commence a joint representative action until it is authorized to do so by
at least two consumers or investors. See id. at 10.
206 See REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 27; MAGNIER, supra note 149, at 10.
207 See REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 27-28; MAGNIER, supra note 149, at
11.
TION
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does not authorize representative or aggregate litigation. 20 8 As a
result, the threat of a damages class action, to induce the defendant to
20 9
reach a settlement, is unavailable.
Under WCAM, the foundation or association that negotiates the
agreement must "represent[ ] the interests of [the represented] persons pursuant to its articles of association." 2 10 The agreement should
"provide for compensation for losses caused by 'a single event or similar events."' 2 11 Once a settlement is reached, the parties jointly petition the court to approve it. Notice of the proposed settlement must
be sent to the represented parties. 2 12 The court must reject the settlement if "the amount of the compensation awarded is not reasonable
having regard, inter alia, to the extent of the damage, the ease and
speed with which the compensation can be obtained and the possible
causes of the damage," 2 13 among other circumstances. The repre208 See REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 55 (citing BW art.
7:907-910 (Neth.); WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [Rv] [Code of Civil
Procedure] art. 1013-1018 (Neth.)); see also TZANKOVA, supra note 150, at I (describing the settlement proceeding); Mulheron, supra note 5, at 424-25 (describing the
history of the Dutch class action regime); Nagareda, supra note 3, at 37-41 (describing "mismatches" in the Dutch settlement of the Royal Dutch Shell case); Tzankova &
Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 151, at 2, 4; The Dutch 'Class Action (FinancialSettlement) Act' ('WCAM'), RIJKSOVERHEID [Gov'T], 4, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/
bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/circulaires/2008/06/24/the-dutch-classaction-financial-settlement-act-wcam/wcamenglish.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2010)
[hereinafter Dutch Ministry of Justice Circular] (arguing that WCAM avoids "blackmail settlement[s]").
209 See TZANKOVA, supra note 151, at 6; REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note
87, at 55; Nagareda, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that "the Royal Dutch Shell settlement
invite[d] renewed attention ... to when and how a lack of embrace for the enabling
potential of aggregation might undermine the legitimacy of aggregate peacemaking"); Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 151, at 7; Dutch Ministry of Justice Circular, supra note 208, at 4 (explaining the rationale of the Dutch system).
Although Dutch law also authorizes representative or collective actions, see supra Part
II.C.l.a, those actions may not seek money damages. In the event the prospective
defendant denies liability, a collective action may be brought to determine the underlying question of liability. If liability is found, then the defendant may choose to
negotiate a settlement under WCAM.
210 ' BW art. 7:907(1) (Neth.), translated in Dutch Ministry ofJustice Circular, supra
note 208, at 1-2; see also Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 151, at 8 (noting that such representation is necessary).
211 Dutch Ministry of Justice Circular, supra note 208, at 2.
212 See TZANKOVA, supra note 151, at 7; REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note
87, at 55; Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 151, at 8-9.
213 BW art. 7:907(3) (b) (Neth.), translated in Dutch Ministry of Justice Circular,
supra note 208, at 2.
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sented parties have an opportunity to opt out of the settlement.2 14 If
they do not opt out, they are bound by the settlement if it is
approved. 2 15 According to the explanatory memorandum that accompanied the legislation,
The binding effect of the court approved settlement agreement
is comparable to that of a normal court judgment in accordance
with Article 236 Rv, in that, in the same sense as the preclusive
effect of ajudgment, the effect of a settlement agreement is that a
dispute may not entail a renewed discussion of the contents of the
agreement. In fact, the interested parties are prevented from
2 16
addressing the court in this regard.
The Report of the Netherlands quarrels with this conclusion, noting that an order approving a settlement has no preclusive effect
itself, but adds that a court-approved settlement agreement is contractually binding. 21 7 This quarrel reinforces the need for further
research on the varying preclusive effects accorded to settlements, on
the one hand, and group judgments, on the other, an issue raised in
section III.B.3 above.
This discussion of the representative actions available in the participating European countries supports a few tentative conclusions.
First, the collective actions authorized in France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland differ significantly from American class
actions both in the limitation on the type of relief and in the binding
effect of the judgments. The plaintiff organizations can seek only
declaratory or injunctive relief, not money damages. This limitation
on the type of relief available in collective actions is consistent with
the general preference in civil law systems for specific performance,

214 See REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 55 (citing BW art. 7:908(1)
(Neth.); Rv art. 1013(5) (Neth.); BW art. 7:908(2) (Neth) (providing that "[t]he declaration that the agreement is binding shall have no consequences for a person entitled to compensation who has [provided written notice] ... that he does not wish to
be bound"), translated in Dutch Ministry of Justice Circular, supra note 208, at 3); see
also Mulheron, supra note 5, at 425 (discussing a class member's right to opt out of a
settlement agreement).
215

See TZANKOVA, supra note 151, at 1, 8; REPORT OF

THE NETHERLANDS,

supranote

87, at 55; Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 151, at 9.
216 REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 55 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (translating into English TWEEDE KAMER DER STATENGENERAAL, MEMORIE
TIEVE AFWIKKELING

(2003-2004)).
217 See id.

VAN TOELICHTING [EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM],

WET COLLEC-

MASSASCHADE [LAW ON COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENT OF MASS DAMAGE]
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rather than money damages, in contracts cases.218 Furthermore, only
the organizational plaintiff is bound by the judgment, not the individual members. Thus, while these collective actions in no way preclude
individual actions for money damages, they fail to facilitate or streamline recovery by a large group of similarly situated individuals.
Second, while money damages are available in the group actions
authorized in Sweden, Spain, and France and in the collective settlements in the Netherlands, these proceedings, too, differ in important
ways from American-style class actions. The Swedish and French judgments are binding only on those individuals who affirmatively "opt
in," reflecting greater concern for actual notice and individual autonomy. While the Spanish group action judgment is binding on absentees and the Dutch settlement is binding on all those notified who fail
to opt out, these vehicles are of limited utility. The Spanish group
actions pursue only consumer claims, rather than the wide range of
claims that American class actions prosecute. And the Dutch procedure is available only where the defendant and the representative
organization reach a settlement. Because the Dutch procedure does
not authorize representative or aggregate litigation, it cannot be used
to compel an unwilling defendant to change its behavior (e.g., to
reform the prison system) nor can the threat of a damages class action
be used to induce the defendant to settle.
2.

Test Case Actions
In test case actions authorized under the laws of England and

Wales and Germany, 2 19 the court aggregates individually filed actions;
no representative commences proceedings (or negotiates a settlement) on behalf of, or to pursue the collective interest of, absentees
220
who have not themselves initiated litigation.
218 See, e.g., RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 739-40 (6th ed.
1998); see also RonaldJ. Scalise, Jr., Why No "EfficientBreach" in the Civil Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 Am.J. COMP. L. 721,
726-30 (2007) (discussing the civil law system's preference for specific performance).
219 Sweden and Switzerland also permit test cases to be brought, but the device
has not been employed frequently. While the judgment in a Swedish test case has
precedential effect in other cases raising the same issue, it "does not have legal force
[i.e., preclusive effect]." REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra note 99, at 34. In Switzerland,
"[t] he judgment in a test case does not have res judicata effect for or against those
claimants not formally parties to the litigation. Moreover, some have raised the question whether the contractual obligation to accept the judgment as binding is judicially
enforceable." BAUMGARTNER, supra note 152, at 43.
220 See HODGES, supra note 146, at 2 (explaining that the GLO mechanism "is not
regarded as representativelitigation, since it covers all individual claims that have been
brought"); MULHERON, supra note 165, at 99 (noting that the group litigation order
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Section III of Part 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) of
England and Wales, 22 1 added in 2000, governs group litigation, or "a
number of claims" 222 that "give rise to common or related issues of
fact or law (the 'GLO issues')."2 23 The group litigation mechanism
was crafted by the courts and was not enacted legislatively by the Parliament, so the political debate was limited. 224 According to the Practice Direction, which supplements the Civil Procedure Rules, each
group member commences her own action individually. 2 25 Upon the
application of a party or on the court's own initiative, 226 the court may
enter a Group Litigation Order (GLO), which specifies the GLO
(GLO) schema does not "permit recovery of damages for an unknown mass of plaintiffs"); ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE 519 (2006) ("Unlike representative proceedings and class actions, the claims included within a GLO remain separate
claims. Requiring the issue of claim forms has the benefit of clarifying that group
members have formal litigant or party status."); Andrews, supra note 165, at 249
("Group actions are different from class actions because each group litigant is a member of a procedural class as a party, rather than as a represented non-party."); Rachael
Mulheron, Some Difficulties with Group Litigation Orders-andWhy a Class Action Is Superior, 24 Crv. JUST. Q. 40, 47-48 (2005) (identifying several differences between class
actions and the GLO regime); Janet Walker, CrossborderClass Actions: A View from Across
the Border,2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 755, 766 (stating that a GLO "consolidates claims for
the purpose of efficient case management but that does not designate one claimant as
the representative of the others").
221 The group litigation procedure was added by the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules, 2000, S.I. 2000/221, sched. 2 (U.K.), available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2000/221/pdfs/uksi_20000221_en.pdf.
222 CPR 19.11(1) (Eng.); see also MULHERON, supra note 165, at 98 (discussing the
numerosity requirement and noting that a proposal to require a minimum of ten
claims was rejected).
223 CPR 19.10 (Eng.); see also MULHERON, supra note 165, at 98 (discussing the
commonality requirement); ZuCKERMAN, supra note 220, at 517; Andrews, supra note
165, at 258 (providing an overview of England's group action procedures). For further discussion of Group Litigation Orders, see generally REPORT OF ENGLAND &
WALES, supra note 87, at 29-30; HODGES, MULTI-Party Actions, supra note 165;
HODGES, supra note 146, at 2-3, 10-20; MULHERON, supranote 165, at 94-111; ZUCKERMAN, supra note 220, at 515-27; Andrews, supra note 165, at 258-62; Mildred, supra
note 153, at 616-72; Mulheron, supra note 5, at 427-31, identifying legal and practical difficulties with the GLO regime; and Scott Campbell, English Classes, LAWYER 2B
(Dec. 20, 2007), http://12b.thelawyer.com/english-classes/130561.article.
224 See HODGES, supra note 146, at 2. For a discussion of the objectives of the GLO
procedure, see ZUCKERMAN, supra note 220, at 516.
225 See CPR Prac. Direction 19B 6.1A (Eng.) [hereinafter GP Practice Direction],
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/pdf/practice-directions/
pd-partl9b.pdf; see also Mulheron, supra note 220, at 48-49 (describing the 2002
amendment that imposed this requirement).
226 See GP Practice Direction, supra note 225,
3.1, 4; HODGES, ENGLAND AND
WALES, supra note 165, at 13, 21; ZUCKERMAN, supra note 220, at 518; Andrews, supra
note 165, at 259.
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issues and claims that will be managed as a group, establishes a group
register on which to record the claims to be managed under the GLO,
and specifies the court that will manage the claims on the group register (the "management court") 227 The court may not enter a GLO
without the consent of the Lord ChiefJustice, the Vice-Chancellor, or
the Head of Civil Justice. 228 A GLO may transfer extant claims raising
GLO issues to the management court, direct that new claims raising
GLO issues be filed in the management court, and order publicity of
the GLO. 2 29 Because each plaintiff files her own claim, 230 however,

each consents to the court's jurisdiction 23 1 (without the need for a
fiction ;! la Shutts). 232 Although Rule 19.11 specifically provides that
the GLO may "direct... entry on the group register" of claims raising
one or more GLO issues233 and further permits "[a] party to a claim
entered on the group register... [to] apply to the management court
for the claim to be removed from the register" 234 -a procedure that
sounds like an opt-out mechanism-commentators uniformly contend that "claimants must actively opt in and register their claims
under the GLO." 23 5 One British commentator reconciles this seem-

ing inconsistency as follows:
227 See CPR 19.11 (Eng.); see also REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at
30 (summarizing Rule 19.11); ZucKERMAN, supra note 220, at 517-18.
228 See GP Practice Direction, supra note 225, 3.3; see also MULHERON, supra note
165, at 98-99, 101 ("[C]onsent of the Lord Chief Justice or the Vice-Chancellor is
required before a GCO is possible."); ZucKERMAN, supra note 220, at 518; Andrews,
supra note 165, at 259 ("[A]n application for a group litigation order . . . will be
considered by a judge.").
229 See CPR 19.11(3) (Eng.); see also REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note
87, at 30 (summarizing Rule 19.11); HODGES, ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 165, at
18 (discussing commencement of a claim, cut-off dates, and limitations); ZucKERMAN,
supra note 220, at 518 (discussing the provisions that the GLO may order, including
publicizing the claims or setting cut-off dates); Andrews, supra note 165, at 259 (discussing procedural aspects of GLOs, including specification of a management court
and publicity of the order).
230 See Walker, supra note 220, at 766-67.
231 See id.
232 See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-13 (1985) (concluding that
absent class members who decline to opt out are deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion
Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1148, 1170, 1185-87
(1998) (challenging the Court's implied consent rationale); Rhonda Wasserman, The
Curious Complications with Back-End Opt-Out Rights, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 373, 406-08
(2007) (same).
233 CPR 19.11(3) (a) (iii) (Eng.); see also ZUCKERMAN, supra note 220, at 518-19.
234 CPR 19.14(1) (Eng.); see also ZucKERmAN, supra note 220, at 519.
235 Campbell, supra note 223; accord HODGES, ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note
165, at 10; MULHERON, supra note 165, at 99 ("The GLO schema is an optin regime

362

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

86:1

Those wishing to join and take advantage of group litigation ...
must either affirmatively register as parties to the relevant claim, or
at least have their particular claims adjoined by judicial consolidation to the group action. Therefore group actions involve positive
opting-in, or at least a positive decision to litigate. This contrasts with
representative proceedings where no such positive decision is
necessary.

23 6

Even though each plaintiff makes this positive decision to litigate,
the GLO process is akin to a class action in that the management
court may direct that "one or more claims on the group register...
proceed as test claims"23 7 and may appoint the solicitor of one of the
parties to serve as lead solicitor. 238 The court will select as test cases
those that "best typify and adequately represent the full range of common issues arising between the parties." 23 9 The Practice Direction

....in which litigants have to choose affirmatively to litigate by entering their names
on the group register, or having their claims adjoined by judicial consolidation to the
group action." (footnotes omitted)); ZucKERmAN, supranote 220, at 522 ("[T]he CPR
group litigation system is an opt-in system" (footnote omitted)); Choi & SilbermAn,
supra note 3, at 487 ("Parties who want to join the group litigation must affirmatively
opt in."); Mulheron, supra note 220, at 47; Walker, supra note 220, at 766-67 (citing
England as an example of opt-in class action); Degos & Morson, supra note 146, at 35;
see a/soJULEs STUYCK ET AL., STUDY CTR. FOR CONSUMER LAW, AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE

MEANS

OF CONSUMER REDRESS OTHER THAN REDRESS THROUGH

291 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports studies/comparative-report-en.pdf (stating that in the
United Kingdom, "citizens who wish to benefit from a collective action for individual
damages must affirmatively declare their desire by opting-in to the collective action").
236 Andrews, supra note 165, at 260 (emphasis added); see also ZUCKERMAN, supra
note 220, at 525 n.80 (distinguishing opt-out class actions because there, "all persons
who fall within the class definition are automatically included in the action, and are
bound by the class action outcome, unless they take some positive step to dissociate
themselves from the action"); Mulheron, supra note 220, at 47 (noting that in the
GLO opt-in regime, litigants "have to choose affirmatively to litigate"). For a summary of the various arguments for and against the opt-in approach, see id. at 50-51
tbl. 1.
237 CPR 19.13(b) (Eng.); see also REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at
30 ("[T]he court may give directions, including directions.., providing for one of
more claims in the group register to proceed as test claims."); ZUCKERMAN, supra note
220, at 519-20 ("[1] n practice, courts will aim to select the smallest number of cases
that taken together.., adequately represent the full range of common issues arising
ORDINARY JUDICLL PROCEEDINGS

238 CPR 19.13(c) (Eng.); see also ZUCKERMAN, supra note 220, at 520 ("The management court may appoint the solicitors for one or more parties to be the lead solicitors for the claimant or the defendant group.").
239 ZucKERmAN, supra note 220, at 520.

2011]

INTERJURISDICTIONAL

PRECLUSION

further authorizes the management court to "give directions ...
the trial of common issues." 240 Under Rule 19.12:

for

Where a judgment or order is given or made in a claim on the
group register in relation to one or m ore GLO issues(a) that judgment or order is binding on the parties to all other
claims that are on the group register at the time the judgment
is given or the order is made . .. and
(b) the court may give directions as to the extent to which the
judgment or order is binding on the parties to any claim which
24 1
is subsequently entered on the group register.
Only claims registered on the group register "benefit from the
fruits of group litigation and share it burdens." 242 Although a party
adversely affected by the judgment or order may seek permission to
appeal, 243 a party whose claim is entered on the group register after
the entry of the judgment or order that purports to bind her may not
appeal or seek to have the judgment or order set aside, varied or
stayed, but she may seek an order "that the judgment or order is not
binding on [her] .- 244
Parties who decline to join the group litigation and seek to proceed independently do so at some peril. Although the Court of
Appeal in Taylor v. Nugent Care Society2 45 held that it is not an abuse of
process to file an independent action raising GLO issues after the cutoff date for the group litigation, 2 4 6 it cautioned that the trial "court is
fully entitled to manage the proceedings which he brings in a way
which takes account of the position of those who have joined the
GLO." 24 7 Expressing concern that a defendant may need to divert
some of its limited resources to defend the parallel individual
240 GP Practice Direction, supranote 225, 15.1; see also REPORT OF ENGLAND AND
WALES, supra note 87, at 30 (discussing a court's discretion to provide directions for
the adjudication of group registered claims); ZucK,ERMAN, supra note 220, at 520.
241 CPR 19.12(1) (Eng.); see also REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supranote 87, at
30 (summarizing Rule 19.12); HODGES, MULTI-Party Actions, supra note 165, at 42-46
(discussing the impact of Rule 19.12); ZUCKERMAN, supra note 220, at 525 (outlining
Rule 19.12); Andrews, supra note 165, at 260-61 (discussing binding effect of a Group
Litigation Order).
242 ZucKERMAN, supra note 220, at 518.
243 See CPR 19.12(2) (Eng.); REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 30;
ZucKERMAN, supra note 220, at 525.
244 CPR 19.12(3) (Eng.) (emphasis added); see also ZUCKERMAN, supranote 220, at
525 (explaining the appeals process under Rule 19.12).

245 [2004] EWCA (Civ) 51, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1129 (Eng.).
246 See ZucKERMAN, supra note 220, at 520-23 (discussing the Taylor case); Mulheron, supra note 220, at 41, 46, 52-54 (same).
247 Taylor, [2004] 1 W.L.R. at 1134.
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action, 2 48 the Court of Appeal suggested that a trial court can take

steps to protect the defendant. In particular, the court suggested that
a trial court can stay an individual parallel action pending resolution
of the GLO issues, and, as a condition to the removal of the stay, the
trial court can require "that the claimant should be bound by generic
decisions in the group action so far as they affect the claimant's
case." 249 While perhaps not troubling in the Taylor case itself, where
the individual plaintiff sought to join the group action after the cut-off
date and was denied leave to do so, this decision is striking to the
extent that it suggests that litigants who decline to join a group action
may nevertheless be bound by the decision on the common issues ren250
dered therein.
Germany, too, has a mechanism in place to collectively resolve
issues common to multiple separately-filed claims. In Germany, the
Capital Markets Model Case Act (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz or the "KapMuG") 25 1 was enacted in 2005 to facilitate the adjudication of thousands of securities fraud claims filed against Deutsche
Telekom, one of Germany's largest public companies. 25 2 The
KapMuG authorizes "model proceedings" (Musterverfahren) in the
2 53
securities context, where many claims raise a common question.
The law was introduced as a five-year experiment, set to expire in
248

See id. at 1133-35; see also Mulheron, supra note 220, at 53-54 (discussing the

concerns of the Taylor court).

249

Taylor, [2004] 1 W.L.R. at 1135. In addition, the trial court could protect the

defendant from having to pay the individual plaintiff's costs if she were to prevail. Id.

250 See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text; see also Ashmore v. British Coal
Corp., [1990] 2 Q.B. 338 (Eng.).
[KapMuG] [Capital Markets
251 The Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz
Model Case Act], Aug 19, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATr, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] S 2437 (Ger.),
available in English at http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-/1110/KapMuG-english.pdf.
For a brief description of the law provided (in English) by the German Federal Ministry of Justice, see Capital Markets Test Case Act (CMTCA), GER. FED. MINISTRY JUST.,
http://www.bmj.de/enid/Corporate-Governance/CapitalMarketsTestCaseAct__CMTCA.lgl.html (last visited Nov. 29. 2010) [hereinafter MOJ Page].
252 See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 8-9; Choi & Silberman, supra note 3, at 487
n.104; Michael Stfirner, Model Case Proceedings in the Capital Markets-Tentative Steps
Towards Group Litigation in Germany, 26 Crv. JusT. Q. 250, 251, 253 (2007). Related
litigation was filed in the United States. See In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig.,
229 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
253 See REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 33. See generally BAETGE, supra note
150, at 7-31 (providing a history of the Capital Markets Model Case Act); StOrner,
supra note 252 (explaining the basic features of KapMuG); Hans W. Micklitz, Collective
PrivateEnforcement of Consumer Law: The Key Questions, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSUMER LAW 13, 13-33 (Willem van Boom & Marco Loos eds., 2007) (analyzing the
KapMuG).
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November 2010.254 On November 1, 2010 it was extended for two
years and will now sunset in the fall of 2012.255 If the experiment is
deemed successful, the law may be extended further or even incorporated into the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung)
25 6
and applied more generally to civil cases "arising on a mass scale."

The KapMuG regime has three phases. 25 7 In the first or opening
phase, individual claimants file their separate lawsuits. 25 8 If a suit
alleging violations of the securities laws "may have significance for
other similar cases," either party may apply to the court for the establishment of a model case. 25 9 The court then publicizes the application in an electronic Complaint Registry. 260 If nine additional related
applications for the establishment of a model case are submitted
within four months of the publication of the first application, the
court entertaining the first action refers the matter to a higher
regional court,2 61 known as the Oberlandesgericht,262 which then publicly announces the model case proceedings in the Complaint Registry. 2 6 3 Once the higher regional court makes this announcement, any
action "whose decision is contingent upon the establishment to be
made on the model case or the legal question to be resolved in the
model case proceeding" is suspended or stayed. 264 Like the British
GLO regime, the German model case differs from a class action in
that each investor must file suit individually; no representative com254
255

See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 8.
See Luke Green, German Securities Class Actions: Status Quo Prevails,RIsKMETRjCS
GROUP INSIGHT (Nov. 5, 2010, 12:47 PM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/slw/2010/11/
german-securities-class-actions-survive.html.
256 MOJPage, supra note 251; see also BAETGE, supra note 150, at 8, 30-31 ("At this
early stage, it is not possible to pass final judgment on the efficiency or inefficiency of
this new instrument, but it is not too early to express some doubts."); Stfirner, supra
note 252, at 265-66 (speculating on the expansion of group litigation in Germany).
257 See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 13; Stirner, supra note 252, at 256-57.
258 See Moritz Bdlz & Felix Blobel, Collective Litigation German Style, in CONFLICT OF
LAWS IN A GLOBALZED WORLD 126, 135 (Eckart Gottschalk et al. eds., 2007).
259 KapMuG Aug. 19, 2005, BGBL. I at S 2437, § 1 (Ger.). The court may not act
on its own motion. See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 15, 21; Stirner, supra note 252, at
257.
260 See KapMuG § 2 (Ger.); Stirner, supra note 252, at 257.
261

See KapMuG § 4 (Ger.); St-irner, supra note 252, at 258.

262
263
264

REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note

93, at 37.
See KapMuG § 6 (Ger.).
See id. § 7; see also BAETGE, supra note 150, at 19 (same);

REPORT OF GERMANY,

supra note 93, at 33 (explaining that the individual actions are stayed until a "master

decision" is rendered); Stfirner, supra note 252, at 258, 260 (noting that all actions
filed after the order to stay the decision are automatically suspended).
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mences an action on behalf of absent investors who have not them26 5
selves initiated litigation.
In the second phase, the higher regional court designates a
model case plaintiff and defendant, but they are not representatives of
the other parties. 266 All of the parties to the remaining suspended
proceedings (referred to as Beigeladene or the "interested parties summoned") are summoned to the model case proceeding, file their own
267
statements of the case, and share the costs if the defendant prevails.
Because the German Constitution guarantees litigants a right to be
heard, 268 the interested parties summoned are afforded an opportunity to present their opinion on the model questions to the court and
to play an active role in the model case proceedings (more active than
269
the role played by absent class members in American class actions).
Following a hearing, the higher regional court enters a model
case ruling (the Musterentscheidung), which is served on the model case

plaintiff and defendant. 270 The interested parties summoned are not
named in the caption of the model case ruling; they are informed of
the ruling only informally or by publication. 2 71 The model case ruling
only resolves the common issues; it does not render ajudgment for or
against each of the individual plaintiffs. 27 2 A party to the model case

or any of the interested parties summoned may appeal the model case

265 See StTrner, supra note 252, at 258.
266 See id. at 259.
267 See KapMuG §§ 8(1) (3), 8(3), 10, 17 (Ger.) (noting that such costs are shared
on a pro rata basis); see also BAETGE, supra note 150, at 25 (explaining that the pro rata
rule "is supposed to help especially small investors"); Stfirner, supra note 252, at 259,
265 (explaining that losing plaintiffs must "bear a proportionate share of the costs of
the model case proceedings").
268

See

GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]

[GG]

[BAsic LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBL. I at 39 art. 103(1) (Ger.), available in English at
http://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf ("In the courts every person shall
be entitled to a hearing in accordance with law.").
269 See KapMuG §§ 10, 12, 13 (Ger.); see also BAETGE, supra note 150, at 20 (noting
that class members "are allowed to play a more active role . . . than ordinary class
members in a U.S. class action suit"); Bdlz & Blobel, supra note 258, at 136-37.
270 See KapMuG § 14 (Ger.); see also REPORT OF GEIANY, supra note 93, at 33
(discussing the "master decision"); Stirer, supra note 252, at 261 (detailing the process of deciding model cases). Model case proceedings may be settled only upon the
consent of all interested parties. See KapMuG § 14(3) (Ger.). Since it will be very
difficult to obtain such consent, settlements of model cases are "unrealistic." BAETCE,
supra note 150, at 22; Stfirner, supra note 252, at 261.
271 See KapMuG § 14(1) (Ger.); Stfirner, supra note 252, at 262.
272 See Stfirer, supra note 252, at 262, 264.
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ruling. 273 Once the decision becomes "unappealable," it is binding
2 74
on the model plaintiff and the defendant.
In the third phase, the lower courts (what we would call the transferor courts in a multidistrict litigation) 2 75 decide the individual cases
of the interested parties summoned, based on the model case decision. 276 Pursuant to section 16 of the KapMuG, "[t]he model case
ruling shall be binding on the courts trying the matter, whose decisions depend on the establishment made on the model case or the
legal question to be resolved in the model case proceedings." 2 77 The
KapMuG further provides that the model case ruling "shall have effect
for and against all interested parties summoned," 2 78 subject to a limited opportunity by the interested parties summoned to argue that the
model party's presentation of the case was "inadequate. '279 As a web
273 See KapMuG § 8(I), 15(1) (Ger.); see also Balz & Blobel, supra note 258, at
137-38 (discussing the appellate procedure under KapMuG).
274 Bfilz & Blobel, supra note 258, at 138.
275 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (authorizing transfers for "coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings" by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation); MANuAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.131 (Stanley Marcus et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004) (using
"transferor court" terminology).
276 See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 13; Btlz & Blobel, supra note 258, at 138; Stfirner, supra note 252, at 264.
277 KapMuG § 16(1) (Ger.). According to the Report of Germany, the legislature
intended the model court ruling itself, and not just the final judgments in the underlying individual actions, to be treated as a judgment with preclusive effects and to be
recognized and enforced under the Brussels Regulation. See REPORT OF GERMANY,
supra note 93, at 33. But the Report of Germany also notes that, in the view of some
scholars, the model case ruling is interlocutory in nature and therefore might not be
recognized under the Regulation. See id. at 33-34 (citing, inter alia, Stfimer, supra
note 252, at 264); see also BAETGE, supra note 150, at 9 ("The KapMuG are designed as
mere interlocutory proceedings and not as separate action."); id. at 24 (noting that
the interlocutory model proceedings resolve the model question (s) but do not render
a final judgment).
278 KapMuG § 16(1) (Ger.); see also BAETGE, supra note 150, at 13, 20-21 (providing an overview of the process under KapMuG); REPORT OF GERMANY, supranote 93,
at 33, 35 (citing KapMuG § 16(1) (Ger.)); BIICL REPORT, supranote 67, at 22 (noting
the "preclusive effect" of the judgment on "all the individual cases"); Stfirner, supra
note 252, at 260 (discussing the preclusive effect on interested parties). Even those
parties that withdrew their claims after the public announcement of the model case
proceedings are bound. See KapMuG § 16(1) (Ger.); see also Stfirner, supranote 252,
at 262 (stating that withdrawing a claim after the public announcement only negates
liability for the costs of the model case, not the liability or binding decision of the
model case).
279 KapMuG § 16(2) (Ger.). The Report of Germany clarifies that the effect on
the interested parties summoned is similar to the effect of ajudgment on intervenors
under Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], 2008, § 68 (Ger.). See
REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 34 & n.119; accord Stfirner, supra note 252, at
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page about the KapMuG maintained by the German Federal Ministry
of Justice states, " [q] uestions of fact and of law, arising with identical
substance in at least ten individual compensation cases, are to be
brought together in a test case and subjected to uniform decision by
the Higher Regional Court with binding effect for all plaintiffs."280 The
model case ruling is binding only on parties that were summoned to
the proceedings, however-that is, "the plaintiffs and defendants of
the other lawsuits pending which were stayed to wait for the model
case ruling." 281 Because the German Constitution guarantees a right
to be heard, 28 2 the model case ruling "binds only those parties that
were in a position to influence the outcome" of the model case proceedings. 283 As the Report of Germany elaborates, "German law has
been reluctant in extending the effects of ...

the model case ruling

(beyond the parties and the interested parties summoned) to any possible plaintiff who might be in the same situation." 284 Thus, those
2 85
investors who did not sue are not bound by the model case ruling.
Even for the parties who were summoned, the third phase involving
individual follow-up litigation is necessary; the law provides no mechanism for the expeditious collective resolution of their claims. 286
In sum, both the English group litigation mechanism and the
German model case vehicle permit the collective resolution of common issues, but they bind only litigants who themselves have initiated
litigation; they do not bind absentees who have not filed suit. The
German vehicle is even narrower in that it applies only to cases alleging violations of the securities laws.
260. Another commentator has noted that interested parties summoned "are bound

only insofar as they were able to influence the model proceedings. This implies that
investors who have joined model proceedings at a later stage or have not brought a
suit at all are not bound by the model decision." BAETGE, supra note 150, at 20; see
also Micklitz, supra note 253, at 31 (outlining the binding effect of settlements and

decisions of a model case on all "passive" group members).
280

MOJ Page, supra note 251 (emphasis added).

281 REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 35. Parties that had not yet commenced
proceedings at the time the cases were referred to the higher regional court and that
were not summoned to the model case proceedings are not bound. See BAETGE, supra
note 150, at 20 ("IT] he model judgment binds only those parties that were in a position to influence the outcome .... ."); REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 34.

282 See

GRUNDGESETZ

art. 103(1) (Ger.).

283
284

BAETGE,

285

See Stfirner, supra note 252, at 262.

REPORT

supra note 150, at 20.
OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 35.

286 See BAETGE, supra note 150, at 13; Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 45, at 182-83
("[T]here is no mechanism for expeditious resolution of the remaining .. . claims
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With few exceptions, then, the domestic laws authorizing group
litigation in the participating European countries are careful to bind
only those individuals who personally choose to file suit or who affirmatively opt to be represented by others. The laws reflect skepticism of
American-style class actions and our willingness to bind absentees who
do not personally initiate suit or even opt into group litigation. This
skepticism reflects the European conception of individualized
justice.287

Given this reluctance on the part of the participating European
countries to bind absentees, it is critical to determine which country's
preclusion law the courts in these countries would apply to determine
the binding effect of a foreign judgment. Stated differently, if courts
in the participating European countries were to recognize American
class action judgments, would they apply American preclusion law or
their own domestic preclusion law to determine the binding effect of
a class action judgment on absent class members? In light of the substantial variations between European and American group litigation
practices and preclusion laws, this choice-of-law issue may be as important as the recognition issue that has captured the attention of American courts struggling with the certification of transnational class
actions.
D.
1.

Choice of Preclusion Law

Choice of Preclusion Law Governing a Judgment Entitled to
Recognition Under the Brussels/Lugano Regime

Let us begin by first determining which country's law governs the
preclusive effects of a foreign judgment entitled to recognition under
the Brussels/Lugano Regime. In theory, three potential sources of
preclusion law exist: the rendering state's law, the recognizing state's
law, or an autonomous body of law independent of national preclu28
sion law.

8

Under an "extension of effects" approach, the preclusion law of
the rendering state would determine the preclusive effects of its judgment. 28 9 In other words, the preclusive effects of a judgment would

be "extended" beyond the rendering state and have the same effects
in other states. From a policy perspective, adoption of the "extension
287 See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and
Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 Am.J. COMp. L. 363, 398-99 (2008)
(focusing on France).

288
289

See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 53-54, 62.
See id. at 53-54.
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of effects" approach would promote respect and cooperation among
the nations of Europe and reduce the risk of inconsistent judgments
and the concomitant risk of nonrecognition of judgments on the
grounds of irreconcilability. 290 The BIICL Report appears to support

this approach, arguing, "to ensure that ajudgment's effect is the same
throughout all the Member States, the application of the law of the
state of origin might be advocated to determine the conditions for
and the scope of a judgment's preclusive effect." 291 This is, of course,
the approach that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted in defining
the obligation of American states to recognize sister-state judgments
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 292 and the
2 93
Full Faith and Credit statute.
Alternatively, under an "equalization of effects" approach, the
recognizing state would apply its own preclusion law to determine the
effects of another country's judgment.29 4 Stated differently, domestic
judgments and foreign judgments would have the same preclusive
effects, which would be determined by the preclusion law of the recognizing state.2 95 The "equalization of effects" approach is easier for
courts to apply than the "extension of effects" approach because the
courts do not have to ascertain or apply the potentially unfamiliar preclusion law of the rendering state.2 96 (Under a combined or dual
approach, the recognizing state would accord the rendering state's
judgment no greater preclusive effects than it would receive under
either the law of the rendering state or the law of the recognizing
297
state.)
290 See id. at 61.
291 Id. at 58. Nevertheless, the BIICL Report suggests that the recognizing state's
law may govern the "procedural aspects of recognition," such as time limits for invoking preclusion and the court's authority to raise preclusion sua sponte. Id. at 58-59,
66-67.
292 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
293 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006); see, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233
(1998) ("For claim and issue preclusion (resjudicata) purposes... the judgment of
the rendering State gains nationwide force." (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 372 (1996); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485
(1982))); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 516 U.S. at 377 ("The Full Faith and Credit Act
...directs all courts to treat a state-courtjudgment with the same respect that it would
receive in the courts of the rendering State.").
294 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 54.
295 See id.
296 Id. at 62.
297 Id. at 54 & n.380 (citing, inter alia, Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, 1988 E.C.R.
645); see also id. at 54 n.380 ("[A] dual limit should be imposed: the judgment cannot
have greater effects in the State in which enforcement is sought than it would have in
the State in which it was delivered, nor can it produce greater effects than similar
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Finally, the Brussels/Lugano Regime itself could specify the
preclusive effects ofjudgments entitled to recognition thereunder, in
which case an autonomous body of law-independent of the states'
national laws-would govern.
No express term of the Brussels Regulation or the Brussels or
Lugano Conventions governs the preclusive effect of judgments entitled to recognition thereunder.2 98 Noting differences among the
Member States' national laws on the preclusive effects of judgments,
the Schlosser Report states that " [t] he Working Party did not consider
it to be its task to find a general solution to the problems arising from
these differences in the national legal systems." 299 The BIICL Report
submits "even today-the Brussels Regulation, and equally the
Lugano Convention, cannot be construed as harmonising the effect of
court decisions. In the absence of European law, the application of
300
national law is thus necessitated."

But which nation's preclusion law governs? Although the BIICL
Report contends that the Brussels/Lugano Regime leaves "unregulated" the "crucial" question of "which legal system is to govern the
3 0 1 it
preclusive effects of a judgment after it has been recognised,
suggests that commentary on the Brussels Convention and European
Court ofJustice (ECJ) case law may provide some guidance.3 0 2 In particular, the Jenard Report on the Brussels Convention and a decision
local judgments would." (quoting Hoffman, 1988 E.C.R. 20 (opinion of AdvocateGeneral Darmon))).
298 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 58, 62.
299 PETER SCHLOSSER, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION, 1979 O.J. (L 59) 128, 191
[hereinafter SCHLOSSER REPORT]; see also BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 54-55 (discussing the Schlosser Report). In the context of lis
alibipendens, by contrast, an autonomous body of law governs. The Brussels/Lugano Regime requires a court to stay its
hand when a suit is filed among the same parties on the same cause of action raised in
a still-pending action. Brussels Regulation, supra note 69, art. 27; Lugano Convention, supra note 69, art. 21. In this context, the "terms 'same cause of action' and
,same parties,' which are stated in Article 27 BR and 21 LC, must be interpreted and
applied independently from national law." BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 63. In
other words, in the lis
alibi pendens context, member states employ an autonomous
body of law to determine whether the "same parties" are bringing the "same cause of
action." Id.; see also id. at 63-65 (discussing the definition of these terms in the lis
alibi
pendens context). The BIICL Report cautions against the application of these autonomous definitions of "same parties" and "same cause of action," developed in the lis
pendens context, to the preclusion context. Id. at 63.
300 BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 55.
301 Id. at 58; see also BARNETT, supra note 119, 7.51 (" [N]o provision in the Conventions directly and expressly addresses the problem of whether recognition entails
equalising or extending the preclusive effects of the judgment.").
302 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 58.
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of the ECJ both support the "extension of effects" approach and the
3 03
application of the rendering state's preclusion law.
The Jenard Report states that "[r] ecognition must have the result
of conferring on judgments the authority and effectiveness accorded to
them in the State in which they were given."30 4 Mr. Jenard elaborates
upon this point in discussing Article V of the Protocol to the Brussels
Convention, which governs actions in Germany that are binding on
certain third parties, such as guarantors or warrantors. Article V provides that "[a]ny effects which judgments given in [Germany] may
have on third parties by application of [the provisions of the German
codes of civil procedure] . . . shall also be recognised in the other
Contracting States. '3 05 In commenting on Article V, the Jenard
Report notes that
lj]udgments given in Germany [against third parties] will have the
same effect in the other Contracting States as in Germany.
... Where the beneficiary of the guarantee or warranty proceeds
against the guarantor or warrantor in the competent French courts,
he will be able to apply for recognition of the German judgment,
and it will no longer be possible to re-examine that judgment as to
the merits.
...[A]

judgment given in an action on a guarantee or warranty will
have no effects in the State in which enforcement is sought other
3 06
than those which it had in the country of origin.
This commentary provides strong support for the "extension of
effects" approach and the application of the preclusion law of the ren30 7
dering state.
A 1988 decision of the ECJ, too, appears to have adopted the
"extension of effects" approach, albeit in the context of a case seeking
enforcement of a Member State judgment. In Hoffmann v. Krieg,30 8 the
ECJ considered the Netherlands' obligation to enforce a German
303

See id.

304

P.

JENARD,

REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCE-

1979 o.J. (L 59) 43 [hereinadded), available at aei.pitt.edu/1465/01/
commercial-report jenardC59_79.pdf; see also BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 54
(discussing the Jenard Report). The term "effectiveness" here "refers to the legal
consequences of a judgment in a particular legal system." Id. (citing LAYT'ON & MERCER, EUROPEAN CIWL PRACTICE
24.007-.010 (2d ed. 2004)).
305 Brussels Convention, supra note 69, art. v.
306 JENARD REPORT, supra note 304, at 27-28.
307 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 54.
308 Case 145/86, 1988 E.C.R. 645, discussed in BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at
MENT OFJUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS,

after JENARD

53-55.

REPORT]

(emphasis
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judgment ordering a husband to make maintenance payments to his
wife. After entry of the German judgment, a Dutch court entered a
decree of divorce. Quoting theJenard Report for the proposition that
a judgment recognized pursuant to the Brussels Convention must
receive the same "authority and effectiveness" in the recognizing state
that it would receive in the rendering state, 30 9 the ECJ stated that "a
foreign judgment which has been recognized by virtue of Article 26 of
the Convention [Article 33 of the Brussels Regulation] must in principle have the same effects in the state in which enforcement is sought as
it does in the state in which judgment was given."3 1 0 "On the whole,"
the BIICL Report states, "the legal systems considered reflect the opinion that the recognition of judgments under the Brussels/Lugano
Regime has the result of conferring on those judgments the claim
preclusive effect accorded to them in the state where they were rendered
in the first place."31 1 In particular, the recognizing courts look to the

rendering court's law to determine whether the second suit presents
the same claim between the same parties.312 Most of the countries par-

309 Hoffman, 1988 E.C.R. 10 (quoting JENARD REPORT, supra note 304, at 43).
310 Id. 11 (emphasis added). The ECJ nevertheless held that "a foreign judgment . . .which remains enforceable in the State in which it was given must not
continue to be ,enforced in the state where enforcement is sought when, under the
law of the latter State, it ceases to be enforceable for reasons which lie outside the
scope of the convention." Id. 18. In other words, even though the German judgment continued to be enforceable in Germany, it no longer had to be enforced in the
Netherlands since a Dutch court had since entered a divorce decree severing the
marital relationship that underlaid the German judgment. In an earlier case, Case
42/76, De Wolf v. Cox, 1976 E.C.R. 1759, the ECJ held that a party that had obtained
ajudgment in his favor in one contracting state could not apply to a court in another
contracting state for ajudgment on the same claim even where doing so would be less
expensive than seeking to enforce the ,original judgment. The BIICL Report states
"an unwritten rule has been read into the ECJs case law, in particular in De Wolfv Cox
as referring to the law of the state of a judgment's origin when the conditions for
claim preclusive effect are concerned," BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 62 (footnote
omitted).
311 BIICL REPORT, supranote 67, at 60 (emphasis added); see also REPORT OF SPAIN,
supra note 91, at 86-90; REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 61 ("The
better view is that the English courts will apply the rules of claim preclusion of the
Contracting/Member State of origin of a judgment."); REPORT OF GERMANY, supra
note 93, at 53-54 (noting the assumption of an extension of effects model); REPORT
OF SWEDEN, supra note 99, at 44-45; REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 93, at 45;
REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 89-91. But see REPORT OF RoMANA,
supranote 101, at 30 ("[A] foreign judgment will have similar claim preclusive effects
as a Romanian judgment.").
312 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 62, 66.
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ticipating in the BIICL Project also apply the rendering state's law to
3 13
determine the issue preclusive effects of a foreign judgment.
While the BIICL Report finds that "a majority of legal systems has
adopted the extension of effects approach," including Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland,3 14 not all of the participating European countries concur. Romania has followed the "equalization of effects" approach. 3 15 Now that it has joined the European
Union, its courts may choose to follow the "extension of effects"
approach adopted by the ECJ in Hoffman.3 16 England and Wales and
France remain undecided; 3 17 France declines to accord a foreign

313 See id. at 68 & n.483 (discussing France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Switzerland); see also REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 90, 92; REPORT OF GERMANY,
supra note 93, at 58 (noting that "extension of effects" model applies to issue preclusion as well); REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 93, at 49 (noting that although the
federal supreme court has not addressed the issue, "a consistent application of the
Wirkungserstreckungstheorie would counsel in favour of according issue preclusive
effects if they would be bestowed in the country of origin"); REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra
note 99, at 44, 48; REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 89, 97; cf. REPORT
OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 68 ("Judgments recognized under the Brussels Regime may have issue preclusive effects. However the legal basis for these effects
is unclear."). But see REPORT OF RoMANI, supra note 101, at 30, 33 (stating that
Romanian courts would apply Romanian preclusion law).
314 BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 55, 61 -62 & nn.384, 434, 438; see also REPORT
OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 85-87; REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 52 (noting
adoption of an extension of effects approach); REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra note 99, at
44; REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 93, at 42 (stating that, as a matter of national
law, the Federal Supreme Court would apply "the law of the state of origin; however,
the effects may be subject to modification if they are completely foreign to the law of
the recognizing state" and adding that a majority of scholars advocate application of
the rendering state's law without modification); REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra
note 87, at 88.
315 BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 55 & nn.384-85, 61 n.435; see also REPORT OF
ROMANIA, supra note 101, at 29 ("Romania has yet to develop significant case law on
the application of the Brussels Regulation . . ").
316 See REPORT OF ROMANIA, supra note 101, at 29-30.

317 See BIICL REPORT, supranote 67, at 55 nn.384 & 387, 61-62 nn.434, 436 & 438;
see also REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 54 (stating that "[t]he little
discussion there has been by English Courts on the meaning and effect of recognition
has been inconsistent and inconclusive" and adding that "a range of views have been
expressed by commentators in this field"); REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 40
(noting that some cases apply the law of the state of origin while others apply French
law); cf. id. at 39 ("[A] foreign judgment will have the same effects as it has in its
country of origin as long as those effects are no more than an equivalent French
judgment would have in France.").
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judgment any greater preclusive effect than an equivalent French
318
judgment would receive.
Even if many of the participating European countries apply the
preclusion law of the rendering state to determine the binding effect
of a group litigation judgment entitled to recognition under the Brussels/Lugano Regime, they nevertheless could take a different
approach when determining the binding effect of an American class
action judgment. Thus, one must consider whether the BIICL Report
sheds any light on the method by which courts in the participating
European countries choose the preclusion law to govern foreign class
action judgments.
2.

Choice of Preclusion Law Governing a Foreign Judgment

The final section of the BIICL Report addresses the willingness of
the participating European countries to recognize and give preclusive
effect to "third state" judgments-that is, to the judgments of countries, like the United States, that are not Member States or contracting
parties to the Brussels/Lugano Regime.3 19 Even though the questionnaire asked the rapporteurs to address the preclusive effects of third
state judgments, most of the country reports (like most American
courts) focused on the recognition issue, rather than on the preclu3 20
sive effects accorded to third state judgments.
All of the participating countries recognize third state judgments.3 2 1 Generally, the countries will recognize such judgments only

if the rendering court had jurisdiction 322 and only if the judgment is
final.3 23 Recognition may be denied if the judgment violates the rec318 See REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 42. Accordingly, a foreign judgment's preclusive effect may be limited to its holding. See id.; BIICL REPORT, supra
note 67, at 68 n.483.
319 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 70.
320 See id.
321 See id. In Sweden, however, third state judgments are recognized only if a statute provides therefor. In the absence of statutory authorization, a third state judgment must be "transformed" into a Swedish judgment. See REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra
note 99, at 50; see also BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 70 n.491 (citing REPORT OF
SWEDEN, supra note 99, at 45).
322 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 70; see, e.g., REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91,
at 94, 97; REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 75; REPORT OF GERMANY,
supranote 93, at 61-62; REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 45; REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 93, at 54-55; REPORT OF ROMANIA, supra note 101, at 37; REPORT OF
THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 100, 102.
323 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 70; see, e.g., REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91,
at 94, 99; REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 75; REPORT OF GERMANY,
supra note 93, at 61-62; REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 93, at 54; REPORT OF

376

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

86:i

ognizing state's public policy 32 4 or if fundamental procedural protections such as the opportunity to be heard were denied. 325 Moreover,
many of the participating countries decline to recognize third state
judgments if they are irreconcilable with a prior judgment. 2 6 Germany and Romania impose a reciprocity requirement for the recognition of third state judgments. 3 27 Since absent class members do not
affirmatively consent to the rendering court's jurisdiction and lack a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the proceedings, courts
abroad may hesitate before recognizing American class action judgments. At least one country report prepared in connection with the
BIICL Project explicitly addressed this issue, expressing uncertainty
about whether American-style class action judgments would be denied
328
recognition on public policy grounds.

ROMANIA, supranote 101, at 37; cf. REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supa note 87, at 100

(" [F] inality is not a... condition for recognition, although a foreign judgment that is
not irreversible can only have a limited binding effect in the Netherlands. Typically,
where a foreign judgment has not yet become irreversible, Netherlands courts will
stay their proceedings and await the outcome of the foreign case.").
324 See, e.g., REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 94, 101; REPORT OF ENGLAND AND
WALES, supra note 87, at 75; REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 61; REPORT OF
FRANCE, supra note 101, at 45; REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 93, at 55; REPORT
OF RoMANA, supra note 101, at 37; REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at
100, 102.
325 See, e.g., REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 94, 99; REPORT OF ENGLAND AND
WALES, supra note 87, at 75-76

(framing the issue in terms of "naturaljustice");

supra note 93, at 61; REPORT OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 93, at
55; REPORT OF ROMANIA, supra note 101, at 37 (discussing "procedural fraud");
REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 100, 102; see also I DICEY, MORRIS &
COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 633-38 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 14th ed.
REPORT OF GERMANY,

2006) (positing that "natural justice" requires a court of competent jurisdiction,
notice to the defendant, and an opportunity to be heard). The Report of Sweden

goes further, noting that Swedish class action judgments may be denied recognition
even under the Brussels/Lugano Regime if the defendant is denied sufficiently

detailed information about each class member's claim to afford it an adequate opportunity to defend. See REPORT OF SWEDEN, supra note 99, at 33-34.
326 See BIICL REPORT, supranote 67, at 71; see, e.g., REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91,
at 94, 102; REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 87, at 75; REPORT OF GERMANY,
supra note 93, at 61; REPORT OF RoMANiA, supra note 101, at 37.
327 See REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 61-62 (stating that a foreign judgment need only be recognized if reciprocity exists except where "'the judgment concerns a claim other than a pecuniary claim and no domestic jurisdiction existed
according to German law or in the event that it concerns a child-parent matter'"
(translating into English ZPO, 2008, § 328 (Ger.))); REPORT OF ROMANIA, supra note
101, at 37; cf REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 96 (concluding that its system for
recognition of third state judgments based upon reciprocity has "fallen into disuse").
328 See REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 35 ("I am not certain whether the
recognition of a US style class action judgment against parties bound by it merely
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If courts abroad were to recognize an American class action judg-

ment, they would then need to determine the preclusive effects, if
any, of the judgment and which jurisdiction's preclusion law would

determine those effects. Given the significant differences between
American preclusion law and the preclusion laws of the participating
European countries, 329 the choice of preclusion law may have as
important an impact on the binding effect of an American class action
judgment as the recognition question that has been the center of
attention for so many courts and scholars.
The country reports prepared in connection with the BIICL project reveal a diversity of views among the participating European countries regarding which country's law should determine a third state
judgment's binding effect. The Netherlands and Romania follow the
"equalization of effects" approach and apply their own law to determine the preclusive effects of a third state judgment. 330 Similarly, in
England, a British statute determines the preclusive effect of a third
33 1
state judgment.
In Germany, "[t] he effects of recognition of a third-state judgment are subject to considerable academic debate,"33 2 with different
commentators advocating the "extension of effects" and "equalization
of effects" approaches. Although the Report of France does not mention an active debate among French scholars, it fails to provide a clear

because they did not opt out would not be contradictory to public policy because it
violates the due process rights of the class members." (citation omitted)); see also Ilana
T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a GlobalizedEconomy-Permitting Foreign Claimants to Be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 1563, 1577-82 (2005) (identifying numerous reasons why civil law
countries may decline to recognize American class action judgments).
329 See REPORT OF GERMANY,supra note 93, at 4-5, 37, 38.
330 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 71 n.511; see, e.g., REPORT OF ROMANIA,
supra note 101, at 37; REPORT OF THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 87, at 100, 104.
331 Civil Jurisdiction andJudgments Act, 1982, c. 27, § 34 (Eng.) ("No proceedings
may be brought by a person in England and Wales... on a cause of action in respect
of which a judgment has been given in his favour in proceedings between the same
parties, or their privies, in a court in another part of the United Kingdom or in a
court of an overseas country, unless that judgment is not enforceable or entitled to
recognition in England and Wales . . . ."); cf. REPORT OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra
note 87, at 75 ("[T] he doctrine of merger by which an English judgment supersedes
the cause of action on which it was founded does not apply to foreign judgments.
Instead, s 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 lays down a procedural
bar." (footnote omitted)); id. at 76 ("An English court will proceed cautiously before
concluding that a foreign judgment creates an issue estoppel.").
332 REPORT OF GERMANY, supra note 93, at 62.
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law determines
answer to the question of which country's preclusion
3 33
the preclusive effects of a third state judgment.
Only two of the participating countries, Switzerland and Spain,
clearly adopt the "extension of effects" approach and accord third
state judgments the same preclusive effect that they would have under
the rendering state's law. 334 Even in Spain, however, preclusive effects
under the rendering state's law may be avoided if they "are in breach
33 5
of the fundamental principles of Spanish law."

Although the portions of the country reports that address the recognition and preclusive effects to be accorded to third state judgments are quite short, they appear to support the thesis of this Article:
an exclusive focus on recognition by European courts of American
class action judgments elides the important question of preclusive
effect. If few of the participating European countries would apply the
rendering state's preclusion law and if significant differences exist
between the preclusion laws of America and Europe, then American
courts cannot assume that recognition is the only hurdle to the binding effect of a class action judgment or settlement in foreign courts.

333 See REPORT OF FRANCE, supra note 101, at 45 ("[T] he foreign judgment has a
preclusive effect .... The foreign judgment may be invoked in French proceedings by
the defendant to prevent the admissibility of the new claim in the same litigation. If
the same litigation has been decided by the foreign judgment, the French judge considers that the French claim is not admissible.").
334 See BIICL REPORT, supra note 67, at 71; see also REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91,
at 94, 103-04, 106 (stating that while the recognition statute does not address the
issue, Spain follows the "extension of effects" approach and noting that Spanish law
governs the procedure for raising preclusion matters); REPORT OF SwrrZERLAND, supra
note 93, at 56 ("[T]he effects of a recognized foreign judgment are primarily determined by the law of its state of origin. However, they may be modified, if they are
completely alien to Swiss law.").
335 REPORT OF SPAIN, supra note 91, at 106. The Report of Spain was the only
country report to specifically address the preclusive effects of third state judgments in
collective actions. It stated that "the law of the State of Origin determines: ...
[w]hether the extent of res iudicata in collective proceedings affects members of the
group who have not taken part in the proceeding." Id. at 105 ("ILlegal writers consider that these proceedings may have the effect of res iudicataagainst members of the
group who have not taken part in the proceeding provided certain guarantees have
been respected: (i) the members being adequately informed that the proceeding is
pending by individual notice or publication in the media of the state of the forum;
and, (ii) the said information including warnings in relation to the effects of the proceeding, i.e. that any decision given will have the effect of res iudicataand whether as
affected persons they may exclude themselves from the collective proceeding or
not."). Thus, it appears that Spain would apply the extension of effects approach
even to judgments in collective actions.
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CONCLUSION

It is not enough for American courts entertaining motions to certify transnational class actions to determine whether an American
judgment will be recognized abroad. They also need to determine the
preclusive effects, if any, that the judgment will have if it is recognized
abroad. Stated differently, even if American class action judgments
are recognized elsewhere, they will not provide defendants with the
protection that judgments in their favor should afford unless they preclude repetitive litigation on the same claim abroad.
Although the BIICL Project was undertaken to facilitate "the free
movement of judgments in the [European Community]" 33 6 rather
than to provide guidance to American courts facing difficult certification motions, the BIICL Report actually lends meaningful support to
this Article's thesis. First, it demonstrates that the claim preclusion
doctrine that is part of the national law of many of the participating
European countries is quite a bit narrower than the transactional test
that is applied widely in the United States. Whereas American preclusion law provides robust protection from repetitive litigation that
arises out of the same facts, even if the legal theory relied upon, the
evidence offered or the relief sought is different, 33 7 the laws of many
of the participating European countries permit a second suit arising
out of the same facts if it seeks different relief or presents a different
legal theory. 338 The practical effect of these difference in claim preclusion doctrine is mitigated both by the class action gloss, which
restricts the claim preclusive effect of class action judgments in the
United States,3 3 9 and by the availability of wider preclusive effects
3 40
under the laws of some of the participating European countries.
But even if the claim preclusive effects of class action judgments prove
to be roughly comparable, American courts nevertheless appear more
willing to accord court-approved class action settlements claim preclusive effect than European courts do.3 41 While this is an issue on which
more research would be helpful, the limited information included in
the BIICL Report and the country reports reinforces the need to
address postrecognition issues, such as preclusion doctrine and the
choice of preclusion law, not simply recognition.
336 DESCRIPTION OF THE BIICL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 67, at 2; see supra
note 71.
337 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
340 See supra Part II.B.2.
341
Compare supra Part I.B, with supra Part II.B.3.
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Second, the BIICL Report reveals that about half of the participating European countries do not accord their judgments issue
preclusive effect. 342 This is another potentially meaningful difference

between American and European preclusion laws that may affect the
binding effect of an American class action judgment abroad, which
again suggests that courts that fail to take the second step may not
have sufficient information to assess whether an American class action
judgment will, in fact, have binding effect abroad.
Finally, while American constitutional law and preclusion law permit absent class members to be bound by judgments against the class
even if they never were afforded an affirmative opportunity to opt
in, 343 a review of the European class action and collective action vehicles reveals a deep reluctance to bind those who neither commence
344
litigation in their own name nor affirmatively choose to opt in.
Although foreign laws authorizing group litigation are in an enormous state of flux right now, the current differences among group
litigation vehicles suggest that foreign courts may hesitate before concluding that a class action and a follow-up action by an individual
absent class member against the same defendant involve the "same
parties" for purposes of claim preclusion.
In sum, with respect to those transnational class actions that survive the Supreme Court's recent decision in Morrison, lower courts
entertaining motions to certify a class must, first, ask whether an
American class action judgment is likely to be recognized abroad, and,
second, ascertain the preclusive effect, if any, that the foreign court
will accord to the American class action judgment. This currently
missing second step should not be ignored.

342
343
344

See supra Part II.B.4.
Cf Bassett, supra note 39, at 1087-89.
See supra Parts II.B.5, II.C.

